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1. Developing a European public sphere 
Democracy in the European Union (EU) was placed on the agenda in the wake of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Prior to this, the EU had rested on a permissive consensus, where 
democracy might have been an issue of concern but not of much debate. The public 
protests following the 1992 Treaty brought this era to an end, and in the years to 
follow, EU democracy has become a favourite object of both political discussion and 
academic analysis. Not everyone agrees that the EU suffers from a “democratic 
deficit” as some regard the Union as an intergovernmental organization or regulatory 
regime, where the member states’ governments represent their respective citizenries 
(cf. Moravcsik 1998; Majone 1996). Democratic expectations differ according to 
theories on what the Union is, can be and should be. As a result, some claim that a 
democratic EU might be attractive but unattainable (cf. Scharpf 1999), while others 
again attempt to construct a democratic model that is attuned to the unique character 
of the Union (cf. Eriksen and Fossum 2000). At the same time, the EU itself 
proclaims to have democratic aspirations (cf. Laeken Declaration, European Council 
2001). Against the backdrop of the EU’s own ambitions, this thesis sets out to 
explore the development of a European public sphere, taking on the argument that 
without some form of a common public sphere, it will be difficult for Europeans to 
develop the collective opinion necessary to build a democracy (Kantner 2002).   
The public sphere is an essential prerequisite for a working democracy because in 
large scale and complex democratic societies where citizens rely on elected 
representatives to administer their preferences the public sphere is the only place 
where everyone can meet (Eriksen 2004). Created through communicative 
encounters, the public sphere is a fluid structure that is constituted by private citizens 
mobilising around issues of general interest (Habermas 1996a). It provides an arena 
where citizens can gather information, supply information and exchange opinions. 
However, the historical exceptionality of the political public sphere is a result of its 
connection with the political decision-making complex, because it gives citizens the 
opportunity to scrutinise their leaders and test the quality of their positions and 
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decisions. As a rational, secular, state-free room, the public sphere became a 
“counterweight to the state” that altered the basis of legitimacy of the power holders 
(Eriksen and Weigård 2003). On the other hand, the public sphere is also protected by 
the state. In short, the public sphere is not influential solely by constituting a public 
space; its democratic impact is also derived from its institutional embeddedness. This 
refers to basic rights that entitle participation, institutions that translate public opinion 
into actual policy, and bodies that execute these policies and oversee the process 
(Schlesinger and Fossum 2007). However, the public sphere and its institutional 
reinforcements emerged within the context of the nation state, but in the case of the 
European Union it is a matter of continuous debate whether the EU will be able to 
develop a similar set of institutions with a similar set of functions (ibid.). Thus, my 
overarching research question is: How do aspects of EU’s institutional conditions 
contribute to the development of a European public sphere?  
1.1 Exploring institutional conditions 
The debate about the European public sphere has so far been dominated by on the 
one hand a normative discussion about whether or not the European citizenry has 
enough in common to create a European public sphere. For instance, some point to 
the lack of a common language, history, values and identity as arguments against a 
potential development of a European public sphere (Risse 2002). On the other hand, 
more empirically oriented studies of the European public sphere are trying to answer 
whether or not a European public sphere actually exists, and here are two basic 
approaches. One looks at the role of the media (Peters et al. 2005), and is often 
concerned with coverage of big happenings or crises1. The other concentrates on 
civic participation, and this approach has mainly been conducting case studies of the 
implementation of particular programmes and the inclusion of particular groups (cf. 
Marks and McAdam 1999; Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999). By contrast, what I will 
                                              
1 A recent example is the debate about the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty (cf.  Trenz, Conrad and Rosén 2006). 
Another example is the media coverage of the Haider-affair (cf. van de Steeg 2006).  
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try to do is to analyse the institutional prerequisites for the development of a public 
sphere, given the move from the national to the European level.  
Thus, a second reason why it is interesting to investigate the institutional conditions 
of a European public sphere is that the Union may introduce new dynamics that call 
for changes in the traditional understandings of the public sphere. As I mentioned 
above, the concept of the public sphere is closely tied to the context of the nation 
state. Although I do not expect the features of a European public sphere to be entirely 
opposite to those of the nation state, in numerous aspects, the European Union is 
different from a nation state. Therefore, it is not necessarily fruitful to employ 
national criteria when trying to understand the European public sphere (van de Steeg 
2002). For instance, it is questionable whether the EU has a government equivalent to 
the nation state. By contrast, the assumption that the EU is a system characterised by 
“governance without government” has fostered its own research agenda with a wide 
variety of contributions (Pollack 2005: 380). Governance approaches range from 
multi-level governance theories that are concerned with the distribution of authority 
between the regional, national and supranational levels, to those that emphasise the 
uncoupling of governance processes from authority or government (ibid.). More 
recently, it is the study of new modes of governance that have preoccupied a lot of 
scholars (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). These methods are characterised by 
voluntarism, subsidiarity, and inclusion of both public and private actors. Moreover, 
they are primarily used to ensure coordination in areas where EU legislation is 
difficult or unwanted (Héritier 2003a), and are claimed to be more efficient because 
they do not impose uniform measures on a diverse reality (cf. Scharpf 2001; Búrca 
and Zeitlin 2003).  Although such methods may be regarded as counterproductive to 
the constitution of a public sphere due to their consequentialist origin, they have also 
been awarded democratic potential, and this provides a third reason for my choice of 
research question.  
Advocates of ‘democratic experimentalism’ purport a form of democracy where 
citizens are directly involved in actual, autonomous decision-making within a 
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multitude of organisationally dispersed publics (Cohen and Sabel 1997; Dorf and 
Sabel 1998). Moreover, democratic experimentalists argue that their model to a large 
extent is descriptive of the European Union, and that it offers an alternative direction 
for EU-democracy (cf. Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; Cohen and Sabel 2003; Eberlein 
and Kerwer 2004; Zeitlin 2005). Their conception of the public sphere is both 
decentralised and decoupled from instructions of central institutions, and as a result 
experimentalism stands in sharp contrast with more traditional models that emphasise 
the Rechtsstaat or the rule of law. Thus, the reasons why democratic experimentalism 
is interesting from a public sphere perspective is because it challenges the traditional 
understanding of the public sphere, and brings in the European context that 
challenges national standards. Therefore, I have chosen to use democratic 
experimentalism to explore my research question. Below, I will explain how I 
approach the question of institutional conditions from three different angles, first by 
assessing the democratic attributes of the experimentalist view, secondly by 
investigating its appliance to the EU, and thirdly by going deeper into the institutional 
design it proposes for the public sphere.  
1.2 Understanding the public sphere in a European context    
An exploration of the institutional conditions of a European public sphere may 
contribute to at least two things. First of all, it may help to clarify the prospects for 
the development of a European public sphere, secondly, by doing so it may also 
indicate how it should be conceptualised. Of course, my analysis is restricted by the 
fact that I will only be able to explore a small part of the conditions for a European 
public sphere, and I do it from a particular theoretical perspective. Nonetheless, my 
thesis will be able to shed some light on how  aspects of the Union’s institutional 
arrangements may provide for the development of a public sphere.  
One important point has to be made before I explain the three angles of my approach. 
The particular outlook on the role and importance of the public sphere that serves as a 
point of departure in this thesis has deliberative democratic underpinnings, broadly 
defined as decision-making “issu[ing] from the public deliberation of citizens” 
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(Bohman and Rehg 1997: ix). This is primarily due to the fact that democratic 
experimentalism represents one version of deliberative democracy. What it will mean 
in practice is that I take for granted the democratic importance of the public sphere. 
More specifically, it means that I start out with a democratic idea based on the logic 
of arguing (Risse 2000), which assumes that this form of democracy could be able to 
resolve one of the flaws of aggregative arrangements by at least attempting to prevent 
privacy and individualism from undermining the collective (Elster 1983: 16-17). 
What is more, deliberative democracy may present a strong case in the study of the 
EU because it “claims that it is possible to reach understandings across different 
cultures even in situations where deep diversity threatens to destroy any hope of 
future co-operation” (Blichner 2000: 161)2. However, this presupposes a link 
between society and the political system (ibid.), and one such link is the public 
sphere. In the words of two prominent campaigners of democratic experimentalism:  
“Any plausible conception of democracy requires an interpretation of the idea of the public, as the 
arena in which free and equal citizens reflect on and seek to advance common aims” (Cohen and 
Sabel 1997: 337). 
As I mentioned above, the public sphere is always embedded in an institutional 
framework, but there are potentially great differences between the institutional 
designs suggested to safeguard or promote the public sphere. Habermas provides one 
example of theorists who define the public sphere in opposition to the governmental 
realm, where government-by-law is the basis for democracy. Conversely, democratic 
experimentalists propose a model that eliminates this strict divide between state and 
society. I will go into more detail in the following chapter, but in short, 
experimentalists contend that economic and political institutions fail to solve 
contemporary problems because the debate about possible problem solving strategies 
is constrained by the triangular framework of state, market and civil society (Cohen 
                                              
2 This does not mean that my aim is to build support for the idea of European “integration through deliberation” (cf. 
Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Although I consider deliberative democracy to be an appealing normative ideal, I also think that 
in practice there are many questions that need to be elaborated. This refers e.g. to issues of manipulation (cf. Dryzek and 
List 2003), rhetorical action (cf. Schimmelfennig 2003). At the same time, deliberative democracy can take and has taken 
many directions, and this is reflected in the diversity of the debate it has generated, see for instance, Bohman and Rehg 
(1997), Elster (1998), Fishkin and Laslett (2003).  
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and Sabel 1997). Instead, they claim that a decentralised system that exploits local, 
relevant knowledge will be both more efficient and democratic. Local decision-
makers are given autonomy to decide on both goals and means without hampering 
instructions from above, but are still obliged to interact with the larger society. 
Central institutions are not disposed of; they have new roles, primarily to provide for 
and supervise the processes of the local units, as well as to organize the interaction 
between these localities (ibid.). The crux of the difference between Habermas’ 
version of the government-by-law model and democratic experimentalism is that the 
former subscribes to a hierarchical institutional design while the latter advocates 
horizontality.  
In short, democratic experimentalism can be described as a model of democratic 
governance resting on autonomous, policy-making “self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks” that include both private and public actors (Rhodes 
1996: 660). Furthermore, it is a democratic model that claims to be superior to other 
models of democracy, e.g. based on representation (Cohen and Sabel 1997). 
However, the idea that governance processes can also be democratic is controversial3, 
and therefore, the first question that this thesis will address is whether democratic 
experimentalism recognises principles of a democratic public sphere. In the following 
chapter, I will develop a baseline for a democratic public sphere that permits such an 
assessment. The hypothesis is that democratic experimentalism does incorporate a 
conception of the public sphere that is democratic. Furthermore, democratic 
experimentalists have recently used the new governance processes in the European 
Union to describe how the theory works in practice (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; 
Cohen and Sabel 2003; Zeitlin 2005). Considering that these new modes of 
governance are characterised by voluntarism, subsidiarity and inclusion, it is not 
difficult to see why they have attracted the attention of democratic experimentalists. 
Thus, the second question that will be addressed in this thesis is how the public 
                                              
3 By contrast, others depict governance as a problem solving method that may increase efficiency and even raise the 
potential for legitimate output, but that cannot generate democratic legitimacy because it does not incorporate 
institutionalised democratic decision-making procedures (cf. Scharpf 1999).  
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sphere perspective of democratic experimentalism corresponds to the empirical 
reality of the EU. ‘New modes of governance’ refers to a variety of processes and 
procedures, but the one that seems to be of main interest to democratic 
experimentalism is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC)4. In short, the OMC 
can be described as a policy-making process that relies on broad guidelines, 
flexibility in national implementation, voluntary cooperation and learning (Borràs 
and Jacobsson 2004). The hypothesis is that the OMC is an example of a governance 
process that contributes to the development of a European public sphere.  
Additionally, as a case of new governance, the OMC is often presented as the clearest 
alternative to the traditional Community method5 (Scott and Trubek 2002). While the 
former promotes subsidiarity and voluntarism, the latter is a hierarchical legislative 
process administering a variety of sanction mechanisms. Therefore, the choice of the 
OMC as a case serves two purposes. It allows an investigation of how democratic 
experimentalism plays out in practice, but it can also serve as an illustration of the 
experimentalist institutional design. After having analysed the OMC according to a 
set of indicators derived from democratic experimentalism, I will move on to explore 
the institutional conditions for a public sphere that can be deduced from the 
experimentalist perspective. By comparing democratic experimentalism to the 
government-by-law model represented by Habermas, I will continue the analysis of 
the democratic quality of the experimentalist public sphere. The hypothesis is that the 
experimentalist institutional design is a reasonable alternative to the government-by-
law model. The reason for choosing Habermas’ government by law model as a 
comparative template is first of all that proponents of democratic experimentalists 
have singled out Habermas to explain why and how their theory is more democratic 
(cf. Cohen and Sabel 1997; Cohen 1999). Secondly, Habermas’ model is one 
example of hierarchical models that represents a clear contrast to democratic 
                                              
4 Other new modes of governance include e.g. administrative partnership and new corporate governance regimes, see for 
instance www.eu-newgov.org.  
5 According to the Commission’s White Paper on Governance, the Community Method is signified by the Commission in 
instigating and executing policies and legislation, the Council and Parliament adopting acts, and the Court guaranteeing the 
respect for the rule of law (2001: 8).  
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experimentalism, which emphasis decentralisation and local autonomy as well as 
radical reform of central institutions. However, since the current design does not 
entail a scrutiny of the government by law model, similar to that of democratic 
experimentalism, I will not be able to say which model contributes the most to the 
development of a European public sphere. Therefore, it is important to underline that 
the above comparison will be entirely normative.   
At the same time, it is also important to point out that my intention is not to 
demonstrate which of the two models that is normatively superior. The aim is rather 
to assess what experimentalism has to offer in terms of constructing an alternative 
conceptualisation of the public sphere. Furthermore, the exploration of the Open 
Method of Coordination will indicate if and how experimentalism can aid the 
understanding of how a European public sphere may develop. This means that my 
analysis of democratic experimentalism entails assessments of both its analytical and 
normative value. I will try to show that although democratic experimentalism faces 
many challenges as a normative model, it calls attention to aspects of the EU’s 
institutional design that may provide for a different type of public sphere. That means 
a public sphere that is different from a national public sphere, or at least one that 
requires us to consider the importance of a different set of institutional structures. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The following chapter elaborates the analytical framework of the thesis. Chapter three 
will assess democratic experimentalism against a set of criteria for the public sphere. 
Chapter four analyses the Open Method of Coordination using a set of indicators 
derived from democratic experimentalism. Chapter five assesses the experimentalist 
institutional design of the public sphere by comparing it to Habermas’ government by 
law model. Finally, in chapter six, I consider the conclusions of the three hypotheses 
taken together and look at what can be inferred with regard to the understanding of a 
European public sphere.  
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2. Analytical framework 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how aspects of the EU’s institutional design 
contribute to the development of a European public sphere. Because democratic 
experimentalism offers both an alternative understanding of the public sphere and of 
the EU, I use this model as a point of departure, and attempt to assess what it has to 
offer both analytically and normatively. My approach is three-fold and corresponds to 
the hypotheses that were delineated above. First, the public sphere perspective of 
democratic experimentalism is assessed against a baseline definition of a democratic 
public sphere. Secondly, I investigate how the experimental institutional design 
performs in practice by examining a collection of secondary literature about the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). In other words, I analyse how the OMC contribute 
to the development of a European public sphere by examining it according to a set of 
experimentalist indicators. Thirdly, I assess the experimentalist institutional design 
for the public sphere by comparing it Habermas’ version of the traditional 
government by law model. Taken as a whole, this approach will also allow me to 
explore the tension between the conceptualisation of the public sphere at the 
European and national level.  
2.1 The public sphere 
Reasons for regarding the public sphere as an important democratic arena range from 
views of the public sphere as an arena for citizens to debate the common good, to the 
conception that the public sphere is a manifestation of society's least common 
denominator (Benhabib 1992). Somewhat between these two understandings, 
Habermas has defined the public sphere as “the social space generated in 
communicative action” (1996a: 360). In other words, more than a background culture 
but without an “ethical constriction of political discourse” (1996b: 23). Furthermore, 
every communicative interaction that includes a speaker, an addressee, and an 
audience, can be considered a public. There is no predetermined agenda and no 
boundaries to what may be posed as a theme for discussion; that is the public's 
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decision at any given time, rendering the public sphere an anarchic and fluid structure 
(Eriksen and Weigård 2003).  
2.1.1 Identifying the public sphere 
Despite the fluidity and anarchic features of the public sphere, there are some 
components that allow the identification of a distinctly public sphere. Most 
importantly, this refers to the triangular structure described above. To attain a public 
character, communicative interactions, despite their different forms must always 
include a listener(s) because “[t]here can be no public sphere without the public” 
(Habermas 1996a: 364). In order to count as members of an audience, citizens must 
have access to information about political processes. Thus openness is reasonably a 
prerequisite for the formation of public opinion because people cannot be expected to 
form informed opinions without relevant information, and it can also be regarded as a 
prerequisite for the exercise of participatory rights. People will need to know about 
on-going processes that they might want to have an opinion about. Therefore, public 
decisions cannot be made in secret. 
However, publicity can be burdensome, and there is good reason to suspect that if 
decision-makers and other administrative agencies were not inhibited by laws of 
publicity they would withdraw to their chambers where decisions could be made 
without public justifications and with greater ease. It is also reasonable to argue that 
the public sphere cannot endure only dependent on the state’s goodwill. Its existence 
must be assured in that the public sphere must be available to everyone, without 
censure of certain subjects or participants. This does not mean the public sphere 
looses its fluid and anarchic structure, nor does it mean that democracy rests 
exclusively on one, all-encompassing public sphere. The public sphere consists of a 
multitude of publics at all levels of society and is differentiated according to 
substance and “density of communication, organisational complexity, and range” 
(Habermas 1996a: 374). But at the same time, these partial publics must be open not 
only to an outside audience, but also to the opinions of outsiders:  
“[B]oundaries inside the universal public sphere as defined by its reference to the political system 
remain permeable in principle” (ibid.).    
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Permeability means that everyone must have the opportunity to participate; however, 
in order for a public sphere to be democratic, public opinion must also have an 
influence on political processes. For instance, parliamentary representatives must 
bring public opinion into consideration, and provided that decision-makers will face 
some kind of consequences if they omit the public from the process, this also 
constitutes a system of accountability.   
2.1.2 Core elements 
Below, I sum up the elements of the above outline and assemble them in a baseline of 
basic features that all democratic public spheres must have. Thus, in this thesis the 
public sphere is recognised as constituted by the following elements: 
i) Triangular structure: Without the existence of an audience, one cannot speak of a 
public sphere because the component that makes a debate public would be absent. 
Thus, a public sphere requires a speaker, an addressee and an audience. 
ii) Openness: This also means that public processes must be open, which also requires 
notification about ongoing processes. 
iii) Inclusiveness: Everyone that is affected by a decision must have the possibility to 
voice his or her opinion on the matter. This requires that the public sphere must be 
characterised by non-discriminatory access. It also requires that although public 
spheres may be multifarious, they must be permeable in principle. Thus, there must 
be a potential for participation.  
iv) Influence: Finally, public opinion must be connected to decision-making, as a 
society is hardly democratic if issues supported by public opinion never reach the 
political agenda. If an issue does not acquire political salience, politicians will have to 
explain why in a way that is acceptable to their opponents. In other words, decisions 
must be made accountable. 
Although these four criteria represent a baseline for a democratic public sphere, their 
salience may differ depending on the democratic theory implementing them. In other 
words, all of these elements require institutions to have a real world value. 
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Consequently, whether democratic experimentalism abides by these principles are 
assessed in chapter three, while I look at their salience in chapter five in analysing the 
experimentalist institutional design of the public sphere.  
At the same time, the above baseline leaves open a lot of important questions. First of 
all, to the degree that this is at all possible, I have attempted to build a set of criteria 
that are disentangled from one particular democratic theory. Therefore, the core 
elements are too abstract to say something definite about what will guarantee the 
existence of the public sphere or how public opinion is connected to decision-
making. Secondly, it does not say anything about other conditions for the 
development of a public sphere. One such condition is held to be the a priori 
existence of a collective identity. In the EU-context this issue forms a demarcating 
line between those who denounce the possibility of democracy at the European level, 
and those who defend the opposite. This is also relevant for my focus on institutional 
prerequisites because it raises the question whether institutional settings must be 
based on pre-existing identities to work properly. Some critics claim that it is 
inconceivable for the EU to develop a democratic public sphere because it lacks the 
proper foundation, notably a common identity (e.g. Grimm 1995, Offe 1998). They 
assert that the EU cannot rely on a collective identity, constituted by a common 
history, culture and language, and that without a collective identity, what do 
European citizen have in common that they can gather around? Conversely, others 
argue that it is possible for the EU to develop a public sphere despite hurdles of 
language and culture. One perspective argues that the existence of a legally integrated 
space that allows citizens to interact, and that these citizens recognize each other as 
members of the same political community, can be considered as sufficient common 
ground (Kantner 2004: 12). This overlaps with Habermas’ conception of 
‘constitutional patriotism’, where allegiance is a matter of political rights and 
principles, and not primarily of culture and history (Habermas 2004). Theories of 
deliberative democracy based on the merits of communication imply moreover that 
communicative interaction has the ability to construct identities through reflexive 
processes that mirrors society and its members (Eriksen and Weigård 2003). 
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Therefore, a development of a European public sphere needs not presuppose a 
collective identity; rather they may be coevolving6.  
In this section, I have tried to spell out a baseline of the public sphere that is relatively 
independent of one particular democratic theory, as well as open enough to include 
dynamics that may be particular to the European Union. In what follows, I will 
explicate the experimentalist perspective of the public sphere, which will serve as a 
basis for three subsequent examinations of the hypotheses I outlined in chapter one. 
The first one assesses the democratic quality of the experimentalist public sphere, the 
second looks at how the theory applies to the empirical reality it purports to describe 
and explain. Finally, the alternative institutional design that the experimentalist 
public sphere perspective gives rise to, is compared to the government-by-law model.    
2.2 Democratic experimentalism 
Democratic experimentalism is depicted as the answer to two primary challenges in 
modern society, diversity and volatility. The main claim is that while decision-
making under these circumstances disqualifies uniform solutions developed in a 
centralised hierarchy, effective government equals local government (Dorf and Sabel 
1998). The logic behind the experimentalist model is inspired by Japanese business 
strategy and concentrated on three principles, benchmarking, simultaneous 
engineering, and error detection. Decision-making is decentralised in local units close 
to the problems that need to be solved, and hence more knowledgeable about 
appropriate solutions. Moreover, citizens participate directly in the problem solving 
process both by formulating strategy and determining why some efforts fail or break 
down, i.e. simultaneous engineering and error detection (ibid.).  
The process of decision-making proceeds at different levels, through various 
“governance councils” consisting of public officials, goals set by government are 
administered and local units (service providers) are chosen to perform the consequent 
                                              
6 As a result, an exploration of the institutional conditions for a European public sphere might also contribute to the study 
of its identitarian conditions. In this thesis however, I do not have the space to consider this particular aspect. 
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tasks (ibid: 316). These lower level actors7 link citizens to officials. The former are 
given autonomy to directly, and through deliberation, make decisions suit to their 
situation. In return, they deliver information to central units “regarding their goals as 
well as the progress they are making towards achieving them” (Gerstenberg and 
Sabel 2002: 291). This information is then pooled, benchmarked and reviewed 
according to performance, and subsequently distributed by the governance councils 
to encourage mutual learning throughout the network of actors in a process called 
“learning by monitoring”. In this way, service providers are held accountable to the 
citizens and the governance councils, while the latter are held accountable according 
to procedures and performances by the elected officials, who in turn must answer to 
the voters during elections (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Thus, democratic experimentalism 
envisions a network of local units, or in effect public spheres (geographical or 
sectoral), horizontally connected in a system constituted (and re-constituted) around 
common problems. This constructs an entirely new institutional framework where 
traditional central institutions are assigned new roles. Their main task is to provide 
structures and arenas for deliberation and problem solving as well as to make sure 
that “decision-making proceeds in a directly-deliberative way” (Cohen and Sabel 
1997: 335). Practical public spheres where local actors deliberate about both apposite 
goals and the means to reach them constitute the core of the democratic practice. The 
integration of these two undertakings allegedly creates a particularly favourable basis 
for the construction of new solidarities, and this does not only hold for each 
decentralised public, because “even as they gain freedom of initiative, locales (…) 
remain accountable to a public informed by the doings of their peers” (Gerstenberg 
and Sabel 2002: 341).  
Furthermore, experimentalist democracy requires that decision-making processes be 
exposed to the “full blast” of diverse opinions and interests in society. More 
particularly, the full blast implies that basic rights have to be protected, processes 
                                              
7 “[N]ation-states or national peak organizations of various kinds within the EU; regions, provinces or sub-
national associations within these, and so on down to the level of whatever kind of neighbourhood the problem 
in question makes relevant.” (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 291). 
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must be transparent to invite and inform participation, attention must be given to 
reasons across and within units in order for debates to have the “right content and 
focus”, decisions must be connected to the broader public through mechanisms of 
accountability, and finally individuals must have a right to contest decisions to ensure 
that “such accountability respects the equality of those subject to the decisions” 
(Cohen and Sabel 2003: 367-8).  
As mentioned earlier, the experimentalist model has recently been used to analyse the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Below, I sum up the above outline in a set of 
indicators that will be used to explore the OMC’s contribution to the development of 
a European public sphere. Indicators are: 
• a deliberative policy process based on the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous 
engineering and error detection. The reiteration of this process ensures learning through 
monitoring, and a (re-)constitution of public spheres following the emergence of new 
problems.  
• citizens directly involved in the decision-making and a process that is organised on 
several governance levels connected through a flow of information. Central institutions 
provide arenas that enable deliberation and make sure that the processes are conducted 
according to the principles of DDP.   
• local, autonomous units that deliberate about both goals and means, only constrained 
by the explicit consideration of different types of reasons within and across units.  
• a “full-blast” exposure to diverse opinions and interests enabled by rules of 
transparency, the protection of basic rights and the right to contest decisions.   
• a process of coordination that constructs new solidarities. 
When applying their model to the OMC, experimentalists are quick to point out that 
it, as of yet, does not satisfy their normative criteria (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002; 
Cohen and Sabel 2003). Nevertheless, they do not forego its democratic potential. 
However, democratic experimentalism must also face theoretical criticism, for 
instance represented by defenders of more traditional political institutions. Their main 
argument is that democratic governance does not and cannot ensure citizens' equal 
opportunity to influence policy-making (Eriksen and Fossum 2005). An additional 
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safeguard is required that institutionalises a continuous comparison between rights of 
equality and contemporary political initiatives. By contrast, Habermas (1996a) 
underlines the need for a strict separation of the spheres of decision-making and 
informal opinion formation because he claims that rights can only be promoted and 
protected through a legislative process and legal control. What is required to preserve 
a democratic public sphere is a set of constitutional and institutional prerequisites as 
well as a political centre.  
It may seem as though democratic experimentalism could be regarded as a 
complement rather than an alternative to the government-by-law model. However, 
democratic experimentalism presents a comprehensive theory for the development 
and preservation of political systems. For instance, traditional institutions are 
allocated new roles, and radical reforms of the system of rights, the separation of 
powers (Dorf and Sabel 1998), and the democratic system, is suggested (Cohen and 
Sabel 1997). The implications of these changes would be that the government-by-law 
model purported by theorists such as Habermas would be replaced by institutions that 
abide by the experimentalist rule of pragmatism, i.e. to adjust purposes to means and 
vice versa whether with regard to constitutional law or the distribution of powers. In 
sum, it is reasonable to argue that democratic experimentalism and government-by-
law constitute two ideal models at a similar level of abstraction and 
comprehensiveness, which justifies a normative comparison between them.  
In this section, I have given an account of the experimentalist public sphere and 
delineated a set of empirical implications. In order to illuminate the radical changes 
suggested by democratic experimentalism, I will spell out Habermas’ government-by-
law model below. I also explicate the normative dimensions along which to compare 
the two models.  
2.3 Government by law 
According to Habermas (1962/ 1989), the public sphere originated in opposition to 
the state apparatus and should remain a sphere distinct from the state. In this way, 
public communication will continue to be free and is less likely to turn into a game of 
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power (Habermas 1996a). What is more, decentralised publics cannot be expected to 
function as arenas for matters of general or broad normative concerns, such as 
constitutional issues. A centralised treatment of these matters is essential to assess the 
larger set of different justifications, as well as measuring the viability of solutions 
against available resources (ibid.). In other words, the public sphere must remain an 
arena for opinion formation for both normative and pragmatic reasons, while political 
institutions make decisions. However, the process of opinion formation, although it is 
not directed at a certain goal, it is not wholly random. The public sphere emerged 
against the state apparatus as a result of the possession of individual property and the 
rise of the bourgeoisie. To protect their private autonomy within areas such as trade 
and labour, the new middle class demanded that the state justified its actions that 
affected these “basically privatised but publicly relevant” fields of interest (Habermas 
1962/ 1989: 27); and the arena that was constituted by these collectivised demands, 
was the public sphere.  
In this way, while the public sphere does not act by making decisions, it represents 
the component in the decision-making process where ordinary citizens can influence 
policy outcome. One way of conceiving of the connection between opinion and will 
formation is to think of the public sphere as composed by two interconnected arenas. 
First, the public sphere consists of a “context of discovery” where public opinion is 
created and decision-makers are made aware of new political issues that require 
consideration. Secondly, it incorporates a “context of justification” where decision-
makers must explain and defend their decisions in a broader context of needs and 
available resources (Habermas 1996a: 307). Although the public sphere has no 
formal instruments of power in a democracy, opinions formed in the public sphere 
are transmitted into the political institutional complex through intermediating 
channels of influence, generating power and inflicting will.  
The emergence of the public sphere did not come about fortuitously or because a 
group of people suddenly realised that they had an interest in public affairs. Rather it 
was sustained through the institution of legal rights, in particular the rights of 
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expression and association (Schlesinger and Fossum 2007). In other words, the 
democratic muscle of the public sphere is inherent in the collection of citizens’ rights 
and the fact that they were positivised through the justice system (Eriksen and 
Weigård 2003). Rights change a government's basis of authority and obligate 
lawmakers and administrators to explain and justify the reasons behind their positions 
and decisions in order to achieve legitimacy. In addition to rights, a specific set of 
institutions is needed to realise the democratic function of the public sphere. 
Habermas depicts the political process as an interaction between core and periphery. 
Institutions with decision-making power, also labelled strong public spheres, make up 
the core. On the other hand, the periphery is weak in the sense that its activity is 
limited to opinion formation. Channels of political influence transmit the public 
opinion into the political institutional complex and connect the core with the 
periphery surrounding it. This process can also be described by tracing how the 
political process transforms public influence into political power (ibid: 191-2). At the 
first stage, opinions are scrutinised through public debate. Secondly, the resulting 
public opinion is transformed into communicative power when it is picked up by a 
political party or an equivalent intermediating unit. Thirdly, in being brought into the 
decision-making institutions, public opinion is tried against a range of other 
considerations, such as available resources, rights and prerogatives. In the words of 
Habermas (1996a: 371):       
“[P]ublic influence is transformed into communicative power only after it passes through the filters 
of the institutional procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation and enters through 
parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking”. 
This last quote can also be used to describe the contrast between the public sphere 
perspectives of democratic experimentalism and government by law. For instance, 
experimentalists claim that Habermas and his followers are “defensive, self-
consciously chastened”, and that Habermas in particular has “surrendered too much”. 
Instead of trying to transform democracy, he has limited the role of the public sphere 
to a “reminder” of how a democratic process should proceed. By not trusting citizens 
to make effective decisions without loosing their ability to make just decisions, their 
capacity to control the administrative powers becomes miniscule (Cohen and Sabel 
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1997: 338). By contrast, democratic experimentalism advocates that separation of 
powers, division of competences and the content of rights must be worked out during 
the actual political processes (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Cohen and Sabel 2003). 
Experimentalists suggest a radically different institutional design for the public 
sphere compared to government by law. Another way of seeing this is that they 
suggest an alternative way of institutionalising the core criteria of the public sphere 
that were defined above. In chapter five, I will demonstrate this by comparing the two 
models along two dimensions that represent institutional aspects central to 
implementation of the four criteria. This refers first of all to the issue of rights, and 
secondly to the principle of separation of powers and competences. In short, while 
experimentalists promote flexibility on both dimensions, government by law 
proscribe constitutional safeguards.  
In this chapter, I have outlined the analytical framework of the thesis and described 
how I intend to approach the study of how aspects of the EU’s institutional design 
contribute to the development of a European public sphere, using democratic 
experimentalism as a point of departure. First, I constructed a baseline against which 
to assess the experimentalist public sphere. This will allow me to explore the 
hypothesis that experimentalism incorporates a conception of the public sphere that is 
democratic. Secondly, I explicated the experimentalist model of the public sphere and 
deduced a set of indicators to explore how the theory translates to practice. Thus, I 
can assess the hypothesis that the Open Method of Coordination contributes to the 
development of a European public sphere. Finally, I depicted Habermas’ government 
by law model that will serve as a traditional comparative template to examine the 
hypothesis that the experimentalist institutional design constitutes a reasonable 
alternative to it. Each hypothesis will be explored successively in the following three 
chapters, and finally, in the concluding chapter I will attempt to say something about 
the implication of these analyses for the development of a European public sphere.    
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3. Experimentalism and the public sphere 
In this chapter I will examine the experimentalist perspective on the public sphere 
according to the core criteria that were developed above. These criteria must be 
fulfilled by any public sphere theory that has democratic ambitions, although there 
may be different degrees of fulfilment. For example, a public sphere must be open, 
but the degree of openness that is required may vary between different democratic 
models. Therefore, I will examine each criterion in turn – structure, openness, 
availability and permeability, and influence. The hypothesis is that that 
experimentalism incorporates a conception of the public sphere that is democratic.   
3.1 Triangular structure 
In the words of Cohen and Sabel, their “new arrangements” are (1997: 316):  
“not conventionally public because, in solving problems, they operate autonomously from the 
dictates of legislatures or public agencies; they are not conventionally private in that they do exercise 
problem solving powers, and their governance works through discussion among citizens rather than 
the assignment of ownership rights”.  
Thus, the question is, does their model include perhaps the foremost requirement for 
a public sphere, namely a triadic structure? Simplified, one could say that democratic 
experimentalism involves problem solving in local units, emphasising the epistemic 
benefit of gathering broad and diverse information prior to decision-making. If the 
local units were isolated from each other it would inhibit the development of a more 
comprehensive audience. However, the conditions that have to be met in order for 
experimentalism to enhance both democracy and the efficiency of problem solving 
include a fundamental requirement of “deliberative coordination”. This means that 
local units are not separated from each other, but are obliged to inform others about 
their performance as well as take into account the performances of other units (Cohen 
and Sabel 2003: 326ff). Accordingly, one could say that the experimentalist 
benchmarking procedure constitutes a triangular structure because the whole purpose 
of benchmarking is to expose jurisdictions facing similar problems to each other’s 
performances and arguments (Dorf and Sabel 1998).         
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Local units must demonstrate that they have taken all relevant reasons into account 
when making their decisions, and they have to make their considerations explicit 
(Cohen and Sabel 1997: 328ff). It is not enough to demonstrate afterwards that good 
reasons can be posited for a decision that is already made. This does not comply with 
the principles of democratic experimentalism, because it does not show the necessary 
respect for the other members of the deliberative body. Explicit argumentation 
obliges participants to give reasons for their views; furthermore, open argumentation 
provides a pool of information that makes alternative perspectives and solutions 
available to all decision-making units. This gives a good illustration of the 
simultaneous project of solving problems and promoting democracy. Whether for 
democratic or more epistemic purposes, democratic experimentalism requires an 
audience, and it is safe to conclude that its perception of the public sphere builds on a 
triangular structure. As a natural consequence of this structure, the model also has to 
endorse a certain degree of openness. 
3.2 Openness 
Experimentalism regards openness as a tool for good and efficient problem solving 
because only openness can assure access to the pool of information that improves 
decision-making. More specifically, it requires that “information provided for this 
purpose must be supplied by units in a way that both anticipates and reflects this use” 
(Cohen and Sabel 1997: 330). Benchmarking is suggested as an appropriate tool for 
comparison among units. Again, for benchmarking to have the intended effect of 
altering or improving the behaviour of units that receive a low score, openness is an 
essential requirement because it rests on these results to be known and displayed.  
Furthermore, open deliberative processes are prerequisites for democratic control. 
First of all, openness, or transparency, is one of the “full-blast” conditions described 
above, where “deliberation and decision must proceed under a norm of transparency 
that invites and informs wider public participation in policy argument in order to be 
democratic” (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 367). Secondly, explicit provision of arguments 
appears in records made available for those who wish to monitor that all relevant 
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reasons have been considered. This is democratically important because when for 
instance courts review a decision-making process, they have “a record of fact and 
reasoning to draw on in making their decision” and if they choose to suspend a 
decision this will be based on fact and not “a priori estimates of institutional 
competence” (ibid: 337). Although openness is an instrument for control it does not 
hamper the autonomy of local units; in principle at least, they should always get a 
new chance of making a decision. Democratic experimentalists reject the traditional 
division of labour where parliaments legislate and courts control (ibid.), thus 
experimentalism might prevent that local problem solvers become mere advisory 
bodies at the mercy of the institutional hierarchy. Furthermore, the importance of 
direct citizens’ involvement seems to be acknowledged at all stages of the decision-
making process.  
3.3 Inclusiveness 
Consequently, being a theory of direct and deliberative participation, democratic 
experimentalism would be expected to attain a high score on the criteria of 
inclusiveness. Direct and decentralised participation is seen as valuable because it 
provides for better decisions. Actors that are close to a given problem are thought to 
possess more relevant information about how it should be solved, and by including 
them in the decision-making process, solutions will be more adapt and more efficient. 
In addition, deliberation is inter alia thought to bring forth a diversity of viewpoints 
that offer more alternative solutions (Cohen and Sabel 1997). As was described 
above, access to information is also essential on a larger scale, because isolated 
problem solving hinders efficient problem solving. Rather, deliberative coordination 
among units is required to promote “learning jointly from their several experiences, 
and improving the institutional possibilities for such learning” (ibid: 326). Direct 
participation however, does not mean that all those affected must be present in order 
to make a democratic decision. One version of the equality principle may entail a 
“one person/ one vote composition of deliberative bodies”, but the principle of 
deliberativeness requires first and foremost that membership of a unit is assigned “in 
ways that foster the provision of relevant local information and the crisp articulation 
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of alternative views” (ibid: 333). Although experimentalists add conditions like open 
meetings to guarantee equality for affected parties, or opportunities for objecting to 
membership strategies, the model may stand in danger of introducing a divide 
between the ‘expert citizens’ and ‘everyday makers’ (Bang 2005)8. The question is 
whether affectedness loses ground to professionalism.  
Relevant information does not equal representative information, and if “democracy 
becomes confined to those who possess the strategic faculties that the exercise of 
expert citizenship require” (ibid: 166) it will hinder the availability required of a 
public sphere. Moreover, deliberative theories are continuously criticised for being 
elitist on the grounds that the deliberative setting will favour those with higher 
rhetorical skills (Young 2000; Elster 1983). In the case of democratic 
experimentalism, if knowledge becomes a condition for participation, this criticism 
appears to be even more pertinent. On the other hand, everyday makers are not 
necessarily apathetic, instead they pursue “their own politics of the ordinary in the 
locality” (Bang 2005: 168), where participation is more sporadic and less idealised. 
The question is thus whether democratic experimentalism will generate local units 
that encourage the participation of everyday makers as well as expert citizens, as 
seems to be an experimentalist goal. However, when deliberation is criticised by 
Cohen and Sabel for too often being elitist, the actor reference is to “legislators, 
administrators or judges” (2003: 368). They seem to overlook that this professionalist 
divide might exist within the citizenry as well.      
Indeed, democratic experimentalists do not advocate technocratic governance. In fact 
they claim to have solved the technocratic principal-agent dilemma of asymmetric 
information and noncompliant civil servants. Through the benchmarking procedure, 
informal activities are formalised and “all local purposes and performances are made 
public” (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 321). Thus, although the experimentalist public sphere 
                                              
8 Expert citizens are committed to particular projects, express a cooperative attitude, and have political influence as their 
main goal rather than social solidarity (Bang 2005).  
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is organisationally dispersed, the theoretical intention is also to bring together 
formerly uncoupled arenas and open them up to the public. Another question 
however, is whether this form of access will be limited to observation, or if it is also 
encompasses participation.  
Democratic experimentalism generates a multitude of co-existing publics that 
deliberate both within and between them to find the best solutions to the problems 
they are facing. The intention is that citizens should participate in “practical 
deliberations concerning the matters that affect them” (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 314). 
Citizens have the important appointment of helping officials form the right strategies 
as well as letting them know if and why some strategies fail and should be adjusted. 
Without a doubt, these are important tasks, and it is probable that this type of direct 
citizen involvement will improve the quality and efficiency of public and private 
services. However, the criterion of permeability entails that participation is not 
limited by the affectedness of a particular service. In the words of Bernhard Peters 
(2005: 87): 
“Public communication is freely accessible communication without formal restrictions or special 
conditions for participation. In public communication, all interested laypersons are free to participate, 
to listen or to read and to speak their mind”. 
Because citizens are to engage in practical deliberation, democratic experimentalism 
becomes vulnerable to the issue of scale. Experimentalists attempt to avoid this 
problem by arranging for citizens’ participation in local units where neither scale nor 
affectedness poses a problem in principle (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 322). The question 
is whether the theoretical assumption of localism actually solves these problems.  
If a local unit is constituted by the parents of a certain school, or in the case of 
community policing, the question of membership may be relatively easy. Conversely, 
if a unit is comprised by those concerned with a specific policy area, it becomes more 
difficult to determine whom to include in practical deliberations. Not necessarily 
because people have different levels of knowledge, but because policy problems are 
often defined according to how it affects certain groups. When trying to 
proportionally include these groups, it raises the question of whether or not people 
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can be put into mutually exclusive, settled and one-dimensional groups (Newman 
2005). In defining who should have a say within a unit, different policy areas may 
conflict. For instance:  
“Inviting women as ‘carers’, ‘mothers’ or ‘pregnant teenagers’ to collaborate with government in 
addressing issues of care for the elderly, truanting behaviour or childcare may be viewed as 
constructive in social policy terms, but at the same time may involve the suppression of a more 
explicitly gender politics” (ibid: 132).  
The issue at stake here is not only exclusion; it is also about who gets to establish 
what a problem is about, i.e. the cognitive framework that shapes both the 
understanding of the problem, the perception of its relevant dimensions as well as 
relevant arguments as to its solution. In short, the framing of a problem may affect 
the responsiveness to different reasons. Framing goes beyond the concern of agenda-
setting, because it also denotes how topics are defined by interests, and not only how 
these interests may determine the salience of topics (Reese 2001).  
Consequently, the existence of counterpublics is necessary, where the women from 
the quote above can meet and formulate views that focus on gender, instead of merely 
participating in forums that do not acknowledge such a perspective (Newman 2005). 
Moreover, it is important that there exist an arena where genderised arguments, or 
any other perspective that some feel have been left out during a framing process, can 
be expressed. In other words, not only a counterpublic, but a comprehensive public 
where these arguments may be stated and then dismissed, is necessary. If 
participation is conditioned by a predefined position or role, there would be a danger 
that “the kinds of political identity that are given legitimacy in participative 
governance [are delimited]” (ibid: 135). Thus, the criteria of permeability will not 
have been met.  
The risk of professionalism following from the request for relevant information that 
was described above, may also lead to a situation where participants are not only 
picked owing to the interests or opinions they represent, but also depending on their 
willingness to cooperate. This means that the level of inclusion is not only impaired 
by a potential lack of representativeness but also by “imperatives of governability: 
the reluctance to include actors who are themselves not willing to “play the game”” 
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(Papadopoulos 2006:14). However, supporters of democratic experimentalism 
underline that a basic premise for their model to be democratic is that it is possible to 
object to the norms of membership (Cohen and Sabel 1997). Thus, as long as it is 
possible to contest not only the selection of members but also the grounds on which 
they are chosen, the above contentions can be discarded. Of course, this rests on the 
condition that any membership objections, if reasonable, are responded to, which lead 
to the last criteria, namely influence. 
3.4 Influence 
A major achievement of democratic experimentalism is held to be its heightening of 
accountability through direct citizen involvement (Dorf and Sabel 1998). The 
background for this assertion is the “crisis” of the current constitutional systems 
where the increasing complexity of state affairs has led to a delegation of powers to 
more or less independent agencies. Faced with immense tasks, the legislators and 
government become incapable of controlling the actions of these agencies. As 
mentioned above, this familiar principal-agent dilemma is allegedly solved by 
instituting an experimentalist system because local units that are publicly confronted 
with their own malperformance replace agencies. Moreover, elected officials evaluate 
the bodies that administer local units according to performance, and the former are 
held accountable by the voters (ibid.). 
Democratic experimentalism also entails that problem solving meets political 
principles in the form of deliberation. In other words, citizens are not only engaged in 
finding out how to reach targets set by governmental bodies, they define their own 
targets. This is the essence of simultaneous engineering. Thus, public opinion is not 
only connected to decision-making as the criterion of influence prescribes, public 
opinion making is decision-making. At the same time, the criterion of influence rests 
on the fulfilment of the four other criteria. Democratic influence depends on openness 
in terms of explicit reason-giving and transparency, availability and permeability that 
guarantee a diverse range of reason-giving, combined with a triangular structure that 
can provide for an accountability process. 
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As a consequence of this interconnectedness, the problems that have been mentioned 
in the previous sections also spill over on influence, and are to some extent 
aggravated. First of all, since arenas for participation are constituted by local units, a 
multitude of channels are created that link the citizens with their officials. Under 
permeability, the potential problem of excluded bottom-up generated publics was 
described as a possible consequence if the legitimacy of political identities is 
controlled from above. In terms of influence, this resembles what is depicted as “the 
myth of agency” (Newman 2005: 127). Although citizens are allowed to participate 
directly in decision-making, the terms for their engagement are predetermined; 
therefore citizens risk being reduced to governable subjects with the appearance of 
self-determination9. Thus, the question of whether publics by appointment 
overshadow those publics that are not assigned the task of developing public policy 
resurfaces. This concerns not only the counterpublics mentioned above it is also a 
question of the how the broader public sphere might be affected by organisational 
fragmentation. 
Although democratic experimentalism claims to have solved the principal-agent 
dilemma, there is still an element of delegation that is causing troubles. Because local 
decision-making entails both setting goals as well as choosing the means to achieve 
them, one question is whether minorities that are outvoted in their own local unit will 
be able to align and gain influence through a higher-level arena. When national 
legislatures establish the broader framework, the local units are left with a large 
degree of discretion in chiselling out concrete aims. The problem arises once the aims 
and means settled on by a local unit run contrary to the preferences of the broader 
citizenry. Under traditional government, local authorities may also make decisions 
that do not make everyone happy, but come Election Day, a sufficient majority can 
throw them out. Even if democratic experimentalism underscores the role of the vote, 
the question is whether the power of the vote is equally retained. First of all, the chain 
                                              
9 Protests have been made against a literal understanding of this dynamics, but there is less disagreement over the fact that 
participative governance also involves a certain top-down influence with regard to agency (cf. Newman 2005). 
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of delegation is longer; local units are held accountable by the governing councils 
who are held accountable by elected officials who are held accountable by voters. 
Secondly, because the chain of delegation is so long, it is not necessarily easy to 
identify the responsible decision makers and hold them accountable. Who are to 
blame, the local units themselves or the elected officials? In other words, the 
“external” accountability to service users may be promoted at the expense of 
“internal” accountability to citizens as principals (Papadopoulos 2006). Even if 
decisions are exposed to a wide public through benchmarking across local units, 
transparency is not sufficient to ensure accountability (Héritier 2003b). It has to be 
accompanied by a degree of sanctioning ability that induces “answerability” 
(Papadopoulos 2006: 4).  
Some warn that by dividing society into governance projects, the formation of “wider 
collective identifications” is impaired (Newman 2005: 132). My question is rather; 
how will such a development affect the possibility of addressing a comprehensive 
public? What are the mechanisms that enable a broader evaluation of democratic 
procedures when the highest level of benchmarking has been reached? In my opinion, 
democratic experimentalists have as of yet not come up with a good answer, and do 
not seem too preoccupied with these questions. Instead the focus is on how the 
efficiency and quality of public policy processes can be augmented through local 
decision-making. Democracy seems to be more of a bonus, as considerably less room 
is spent on describing the activity in the wider public sphere except as an upshot of 
aggregated benchmarking against which to compare the performance of one’s own 
local unit. When these processes are opened up to a wider public, audiences appear to 
be reduced to spectators while central authorities control that the local procedures 
have followed the democratic experimentalist standards.  
To conclude this assessment then, if the core problem of democracy is how to make 
citizens regard themselves as self-legislators, then democratic experimentalism only 
solves half of it. While citizens may be directly involved in shaping the policies that 
affect them, their ability to define the higher-level goals is not given sufficient 
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attention. Democratic experimentalism would probably improve the epistemic quality 
of public decisions, but it might also impair the democratic quality if provisions for a 
comprehensive framework for the making of broader policies are not made. While a 
prominent goal is to constitute local units that deal with the problems people face in 
their daily lives, my examination from a public sphere perspective has first of all 
shown that democratic experimentalism faces considerable challenges with regard to 
inclusiveness. First, access stands in danger of being conditional. Because 
participation is dependent on the possession of relevant information, there is the 
likely chance that expert organisations and citizens will be more deeply involved 
while non-organised participants will not have a similar “membership ticket”. 
Combined with demands on knowledge, deliberation may also add up to an 
exclusionary mechanism because of the obligation to justify one’s opinions openly to 
actors that one already feels inferior to (Mansbridge 1980). 
However, democratic experimentalism may also encourage participation by creating 
units that bring politics closer to the everyday lives of citizens as well as allowing 
them a direct influence over the outcome of deliberations, both factors that are 
considered to produce more and broader contributions (Fung 2003). Active recruiting 
would add to this effect (ibid.), and help fuse the gap between the involvement of 
expert citizens and everyday makers. At the same time, because local units are 
constituted as service providers and individuals are linked to these units as service 
users, it would be essential that those who do not fall into these groups of service 
users can challenge decisions that they are affected by, elsewhere.  
Service providers are held accountable by citizens through the governance councils 
(appointed officials) that administer the goals laid out by the elected officials. The 
latter also holds the governance councils accountable, and at the end of this chain, 
elected officials are held accountable by citizens through elections. Every step of this 
ladder implies benchmarking and review, from comparing results between 
jurisdictions to the use of these comparisons during election campaigns (Dorf and 
Sabel 1998). Although one may accept these dynamics, there is still the question of 
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how citizens may influence the primary goals at the highest level of decision-making. 
Before governance councils choose service providers, and before these service 
providers turn to the citizens for help, or just as well at the end of this entire process; 
how can citizens change or contribute to the creation of the larger framework, that 
which constrains the choice of means and ends at lower levels? The openness and 
provisions for transparency that is stressed through the democratic conditions of the 
full-blast does not amount to accountability because transparency does not contain 
the possibility of sanctioning a decision (Héritier 2003b). This means that in addition 
to exposing the outcome and procedures of local unit decision making to the larger 
public, this larger public must also possess the power to sanction these decisions 
somehow. However, as I have pointed out above, the long chain of delegation 
weakens “the influence of the citizenry through the vote as a mechanism of sanction” 
(Papadopoulos 2006).  
In sum, the hypothesis that experimentalism incorporates a conception of the public 
sphere that is democratic is not dismissed, as experimentalism clearly adheres to all 
four core criteria of the public sphere. However, there are some theoretical 
weaknesses with the experimentalist conception, due to the elaborated delineation of 
the epistemic, as opposed to the democratic function of the public sphere. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the salience of each of these criteria depend on how they 
are institutionalised. Thus, in chapter five, I will go deeper into the question of what 
democratic experimentalism offers in terms of creating an institutional framework 
that can channel the influence of citizens and establish mechanisms of accountability. 
At the same time, several of the critical points that I have brought up are determined 
by the implementation of democratic experimentalism in the real world. Therefore, 
before I continue the theoretical discussion, I will take a look at how the 
experimentalist model plays out in practice. 
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4. The Open Method of Coordination 
This chapter explores the hypothesis that the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
contributes to the development of a European public sphere. It opens with a general 
description of the open method, and singles out a particular case to study in more 
detail. Next, the indicators that were delineated in chapter two are scrutinised one by 
one, demonstrating that democratic experimentalism draws attention to interesting 
European dynamics, but also that the model faces some considerable structural 
constraints in practice.  
4.1 What is the Open Method of Coordination? 
At the Lisbon summit in 2000 the Open Method of Coordination was presented as the 
procedural core of the Lisbon agenda, aiming to make the EU “the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010” (European Council 2000). The 
OMC is a policy-making process that relies on broad guidelines, flexible 
implementation, voluntary cooperation and peer review, as opposed to the 
Community method that uses hard law and regulative mechanisms backed by 
sanctions. Thus, the OMC is often referred to as an instance of soft law-utilization, 
which applies political instead of legal means to attain its goals (cf. Borràs and 
Jacobsson 2004). The open method does not set out to harmonise the policies of the 
Member States, nor does it attempt to transfer additional competences to the EU. 
While broad goals and subsequent indicators are defined at the European level, the 
Member States are free to choose how they are going to reach them. Hence, the term 
'open' can "refer to state action, policy outcome or à la carte involvement by states" 
(Hodson and Maher 2001: 724). Furthermore, the OMC relies on the provision of 
expert knowledge and local competence from several actors, “using variable forms of 
partnership” (European Council 2000). In sum, it contains four main elements (ibid.):  
• "fixing guidelines for the Union with specific timetables for achieving the goals (…) in the 
short, medium and long-terms;  
• establish, were appropriate, quantitative and qualitative benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a means of comparing 
best practice;  
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• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific 
targets; 
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning processes."  
Various methods of coordination have been included in the treaties since the EEC to 
manage economic policies (Hodson and Maher 2001), but it was not until the middle 
of the 1990's that they became gradually more relevant within other policy areas. 
Today the OMC is being applied within e.g. pensions, taxation, education, 
innovation, social inclusion and macroeconomics. Most of these areas make use of 
only a few mechanisms, and this use is far from systematic, but one area stands out in 
comparison. The European Employment Strategy (EES) utilises an almost complete 
range of OMC-mechanisms (Borràs and Jacobsson 2004), and it has also served as a 
benchmark for other OMC policy areas (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). Because it is 
more representative of the ideal OMC-instruments, I have chosen to use the EES as a 
case in this thesis. Secondly, because the EES has been in operation since 1997, it 
also has larger potential to render clearer results than areas subjected to the OMC 
more recently. Finally, since this thesis build on secondary literature, the EES has 
generated more studies than other OMC-areas.  
4.2 The European Employment Strategy 
The European Employment Strategy was established as a response to rising 
unemployment. Moreover, because traditional national mechanisms of job creation 
were weakened by the founding of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), the social 
democratic governments needed “to legitimize their almost unanimous support for the 
EMU with their electorates and other domestic constituencies, primarily the labour 
movement” (Rhodes 2005: 291). One major difference between the EES and the 
other open method-areas is the former’s legal basis (de la Porte and Pochet 2002). 
The Treaty of Amsterdam included an employment chapter that denoted a high level 
of employment as a question of common concern. It also improved the institutional 
framework of the EES by deploying an advisory Employment Committee (EMCO), 
instituting annual guidelines and examinations (Goetschy 1999). At the Luxembourg 
summit that same year, the first guidelines were elaborated and grouped around four 
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main pillars: employability, entrepreneuring, adaptability and equal opportunities. 
Since then, the strategy has evolved considerably. The initial Luxembourg process 
designed to coordinate the member states’ employment policies has been 
complemented by the Cardiff and Cologne processes. The former addresses economic 
structural policies while the latter embraces the other two into a macroeconomic 
dialogue (Hodson and Maher 2001). Furthermore, the EES has undergone a number 
of reviews that have brought about several adjustments. Following a broad impact 
evaluation in 2003, the guidelines were simplified and restructured according to three 
objectives: full employment, quality and productivity at work, cohesion and inclusion 
(Rhodes 2005). The EES-cycle was also streamlined in accordance with the 
development of economic policy guidelines (BEPGs)10. Finally, in 2005, the Lisbon 
strategy underwent a mid-term review, resulting in a complete alteration of the EES 
cycle where for instance the Employment Guidelines (EGs) were integrated with the 
BEPGs in order to address both growth and job creation simultaneously (COM 
(2005) 141 final). However, because this reform is too recent to have produced much 
results, let alone studies, I will have to concentrate the analysis on the process prior to 
2005. 
The EES-process starts each year with the Spring European Council issuing strategic 
guidelines. Prior to the Spring Council, a Tripartite Social Summit is arranged 
consisting of representatives from the social partners, the Council, Presidency, and 
Commission. The summit is intended to “ensure that (...) there is continuous 
consultation” between these actors (Council 2003). The Commission prepares a 
proposal of corresponding guidelines and hand these over to the Council for approval 
accompanied by the opinions of the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee, the Committee of Regions, and the EMCO11. Next, the member states set 
down National Action Plans (NAPs) that contain targets showing how they propose 
to execute the guidelines as well as implementation reports to demonstrate 
                                              
10 The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines are guidelines adopted by the EU Council to provide the framework for defining 
the economic policy objectives and orientations of the Member States and the European Community. 
11 Of course, the Council can also change the guidelines. Approval is by Qualified Mahority Voting.  
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achievements. These plans are then monitored according to a set of indicators and 
subsequently used as a basis for peer review within the EMCO. At the end of each 
cycle, the Council and Commission prepares a Joint Employment Report (JER) to the 
European Council where they assess the total progress made within the employment 
arena and benchmark the member states according to best practice. Finally, it is also 
important to mention that the EES is closely linked, although not in a legal sense, to 
the provisions of the European Social Fund (ESF) aimed at combating 
unemployment. Their objectives are partly overlapping, which makes the ESF an 
important instrument for the EES (de la Porte and Pochet 2005). 
Before I move on to the analysis, there are a few methodological points I would like 
to mention that are important to keep in mind when assessing the impact of the EES. 
First of all, conclusions only apply to the Employment Strategy and not the Open 
Method of Coordination in general, although the former is example of the latter. The 
EES is in many respects different from the other OMCs, e.g. through Treaty 
incorporation, range of mechanisms, ability to issue recommendations, etc. Thus, 
although the EES is a prototype for the ideal Open Method, it is not representative for 
the collection of other OMC processes. Secondly, by basing my analysis on 
secondary literature there is always the risk that the contributions I have chosen are 
not reliable, or that the selection is biased.  
4.3 Democratic experimentalism 
In what follows, I will apply the indicators of democratic experimentalism that were 
developed in chapter two to the European Employment Strategy, and look at how it 
contributes to the development of a public sphere.  In chapter two, democratic 
experimentalism was described as a theory that combines direct and deliberative 
problem solving with the full blast of diverse interest and opinions in society in a 
democratic alternative for the modern context of volatility and diversity. The ensuing 
set of indicators can roughly be grouped along three dimensions: issues relating to 
institutional infrastructure, problem solving mechanisms and questions that concern 
democracy. In the following analysis, I will look at the European Employment 
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Strategy according to these dimensions. Because institutional design is the central 
focus of this thesis, as well as decisive for how the mechanisms of problem solving 
and the democracy of the system prevail, I will commence by exploring the EES’ 
potential institutional innovations.         
4.3.1 Institutional infrastructure 
Democratic experimentalism prescribes the establishment of new institutions and the 
adjustment of old ones to new tasks. In short, local units comprised by affected 
citizens are given the autonomy to make decisions where means and ends are 
elaborated simultaneously. Next, these are administered and controlled by governing 
councils that answer to elected officials. Experimentalists have used the development 
of the European Employment Strategy (EES) as an example of how publics are 
shaped and reshaped according to the problem at hand (cf. Cohen and Sabel 2003). 
They claim that the EES has provided a new architecture with autonomous lower 
level actors that inform higher-level authorities about their goals and progresses. The 
entire process is coordinated by a centre, not to be understood as the top of a 
hierarchy but one that pools information, organizes arenas for debate and monitoring, 
and disciplines participants (ibid.)12.   
First of all, the EES seems equipped to promote autonomy because the open method 
“is compatible with both functional and territorial subsidiarity” (Jacobsson and 
Schmid 2002b: 3). Broad frameworks are developed at the European level, but the 
substantiation of these goals and how they are to be reached is left for each member 
state to decide. Although the formal structure is not altered, the EES introduces 
aspects of a new institutional design by not making policies according to the 
Community method. At the European level, the Commission administers the goals set 
by the European Council, partake in the development of guidelines and indicators, 
gather information about the performance of the member states, and provide arenas 
                                              
12 This existence of a centre is what separates democratic experimentalism from anarchy (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 366).  
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for peer review and mutual learning. In sum, the Commission appears to play the role 
of an organising centre as it is designated by democratic experimentalism.  
Furthermore, the Employment Committee (EMCO) regularly brings together two 
members from each member state and two from the Commission. Its main function is 
to assist the Council in the EES-proceedings; it issues opinions on request from the 
Council, the Commission, or by its own initiative. The EMCO also comprises a set of 
working groups, e.g. one responsible for developing indicators. A Treaty provision 
(Art. 130), makes it obligatory for the EMCO to confer with the social partners, and 
on occasion it also holds informal meetings where NGOs and other non-state actors 
are invited. Processes are also coordination across policy areas. The Employment 
Title incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty explicitly stated the necessity to 
address employment issues in context (Art. 126, par. 1). Thus, there are four 
committees connected to the Employment Strategy. First of all the EMCO that is 
mandated to coordinate the employment area with those of macroeconomic dialogue 
and economical reform (Council 2000). Then there is the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) that coordinates the economic policies of the member states and 
the Community, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) that is an advisory 
body to the Council, and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) that is designed to 
promote cooperation between the Commission and the Member States on social 
protection systems. All of these committees coordinate their work amongst each 
other, and it is customary to exchange agendas, circulate drafts and participate in each 
other's meetings (save the ESF) (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005).  
The EMCO also functions as an arena for peer review by gathering member states 
together to compare performances. In line with the Employment Strategy, all member 
states prepare National Action Plans (NAPs) that establish their targets, how they 
intent to reach them, and the progress that has been made. The Commission assesses 
the NAPs according to the predetermined set of indicators and benchmark the 
member states accordingly. These benchmarks are then used as points of departures 
in the review process.  In addition to the review processes in the EMCO, a Mutual 
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Learning Programme brings together member states and other national stakeholders 
to “thematic review seminars” that address broader challenges and priorities, peer 
review meetings that focus more on specific policies, as well as “follow up and 
dissemination activities” that inter alia are directed towards promoting the 
development of partnerships and networks13. 
Hence at first glance, the institutional architecture at the EU-level seems to be 
captured by the indicators of democratic experimentalism. The committees pool 
information and function as arenas for review across units, i.e. the member states. 
The Commission is in a variety of ways trying to create proper arenas for the 
exchange of information, as well as correct procedural failures. For instance, it 
underlines the need to adjust the EES process to accommodate for EP participation, 
and it has continuously encouraged the increase of social partner, civil society, and 
local level inclusion (GOVECOR 2004).  
At the national level, there are also signs that member states have adjusted to the 
infrastructure of the Employment Strategy. For instance, the different stages of the 
EES-procedure designate structures and time frames that discipline national course of 
action, causing members to “focus at the same issues at the same time” (Jacobsson 
2004: 365). The EES has also generated new national structures. In France, 
administrative units and ministries coordinate their work through two central bodies 
providing “a new forum for discussion”, where the over-arching strategies connected 
to employment is attended to (Coron and Palier 2002: 134). However, the EES shows 
ambivalent results with regard to autonomy. First, the process focuses national 
attention, but it also narrows the autonomous realm of the nation state, e.g. because of 
short deadlines, adaptation may become a survival mechanism (Jacobsson 2004). 
Accordingly, the question is if time pressure obstructs flexibility. Furthermore, short 
deadlines may foster commitment to the EES but there is also the risk that they “limit 
                                              
13 See, http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net  
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the possibility to “anchor” policy positions more broadly at the national level” (ibid: 
365). This distance is aggravated by the fact that the EES-processes often run parallel 
to the development of employment policies at the national level (Jacobsson and 
Schmid 2002a). Secondly, the member states seem to use their autonomy as an 
opportunity to adapt to the EES as they see fit. For instance, there is a tendency that 
countries with preferences similar to the Employment Strategy have a higher degree 
of convergence (de la Porte and Pochet 2002). Without going into a discussion about 
the actual efficiency of the EES, some observers call attention to certain member 
states’ propensity to comply with the process in words but not in deeds. That is, they 
loyally produce their NAPs, but without following them up (Jacobsson and Schmid 
2002a).  
Furthermore, the adjustment to the EES-process at the national level seems to be 
concentrated to coordination between ministries. By contrast, a central claim is that 
the iterative character of the EES-process represents an opportunity for a broad range 
of actors to give regular input (Jacobsson 2004). However, studies of actual inclusion 
show variable results as well as variable satisfaction with these new opportunities. 
For instance, in their evaluation of the EES after the 2003 reform, the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (2005) concludes that the EES has raised the 
political salience of employment-related issues. On the other hand, trade unions 
across the EU report that their lack of commitment is a result of the development of 
the NAPs’ being a governmental project. Optimism seems more prevalent in the new 
member states without a preceding record of participatory policy-making. Here, the 
EES has allegedly inspired a groundbreaking infrastructure (ibid.). Conversely, in the 
old member states, different degrees of optimism are displayed. Social partner 
contribution to the NAPs varies greatly between countries, and the level of 
involvement is reflected in satisfaction with the process among these actors (de la 
Porte and Nanz 2004)14. This has led some to question whether it would be more 
                                              
14 In some countries social partners are merely informed (Lithuania), in others there are bodies for social dialogue but with 
weak links to the governments (Malta), still others make out a part of the official Brussels-delegation that present the NAPs 
(Luxembourg), while in Belgium and Denmark, social partner-opinions are appended to the plans (ibid.).  
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appropriate to rename the OMC, the “Open method of Centralization”, as the 
decentralisation it proscribes is deficient (Smismans 2005a: 17). 
At the same time, others report that progress has been made. For instance, some assert 
that the EES seems to have spurred inclusion of a broader range of actors, such as 
regional and local actors, as well as civil society and NGOs (GOVECOR 2004). It is 
also argued that some of these actors have requested influence because they see 
themselves as affected by the EES. In other words, local actors have used the 
Employment Strategy to push forward their own opinions, as for instance in Sweden 
where a network of social NGOs demanded to be included in the preparation of the 
NAPs (de la Porte and Pochet 2005). As I pointed to above, the Commission 
encourages the inclusion of social partners and local actors, and urges the member 
states to improve their communication with national parliaments and citizens to 
“enhance understanding and contribute to greater involvement” (de la Porte and Nanz 
2004: 278). In practice, the Commission has attempted to empower actors to raise 
their voice against governments through funding of transnational networks 
(Smismans 2005a). The main source of this funding is the European Social Fund 
(ESF), which is the “key financial instrument to support the European Employment 
Strategy” (COM 2003 6 final: 19). Both general programmes and specific measures 
initiated by local level actors have received support from the ESF and established 
local partnerships that address employment issues (Evers 2003). Furthermore, in the 
wake of the “Acting Locally for Employment” campaign in 2000, the Commission 
funded over 30 local projects. Several of these projects worked with the development 
of Local Action Plans (LAPs). Some of these projects also have had a transnational 
scope, for instance “Eurocities”, which is a network of large European cities that 
helps its members produce LAPs for employment and social inclusion (GOVECOR 
2004).  
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In studying the Employment Strategy, it may be easy to get lost in the wild complex 
of empirical data, and lose sight of the factors that are not compatible with one’s own 
theory, or to weigh the evidence accordingly. Thus, some emphasise that most 
member states have increased social partners’ participation in the preparation of the 
NAPs as a result of the EES (Zeitlin 2005), while others argue that “progress is 
disappointing overall compared to the incentives taken to improve their participation” 
(de la Porte and Nanz 2004). The glass can be both half-full and half-empty.  
However, only a few countries involve a wide range of actors. The general pattern is 
that the EES is a governmental responsibility where national parliaments are scarcely 
involved (de la Porte and Pochet 2005), and social partners report about being left 
out. For instance, a common document by the social partners have pointed to that in 
only three member states have social partners been directly involved in preparing the 
NAPs (Smismans 2005a)15. I will return to the extent and quality of participation and 
inclusion below when examining the indicators that pertain to democracy, but my 
purpose here is to indicate what may be causing some of these “deficiencies”. In my 
opinion, a lack of compliance can at least partly be traced back to lack of sanction 
mechanisms available. For instance, although an increase in local level participation 
coincides with the EES-process this development is allegedly constrained by the lack 
of treaty mandate to back the inclusion of local actors, hence studies show that 
national governments have been reluctant to “open up the process to their subnational 
fellows” (GOVECOR 2004: 361). Moreover, voluntarism may also influence the 
outcome of the process both with regard to quality and efficiency because the 
invaluable knowledge of affected parties is excluded from the information pool. This 
will be further examined below.  
In this section, I have looked at the potential innovations of the Employment Strategy 
following the institutional indicators derived from the perspective of democratic 
experimentalism. Quickly summed up, it is possible to identify an emerging structure 
 43
that complies with the basic framework of democratic experimentalism. At the 
European level the arenas are provided for, but the autonomy of the member states – 
or the local units – supersede the centre’s ability to restrict non-compliance. In other 
words, the EU cannot force its member states to experiment. Thus, the autonomy of 
the EES has ambiguous results. Next, I will take a closer look at the central 
mechanisms of democratic experimentalism to see how they contribute to this picture.  
4.3.2 Learning through monitoring 
According to democratic experimentalism, in addition to providing a basis for 
rational problem solving, learning also has structural significance because it is a 
premise for the (re-)constitution of publics. This process is indicated by 
benchmarking, simultaneous engineering and error detection, and in what follows I 
will see how these apply to the European Employment Strategy. Following the above 
exploration and its tentative conclusions, the EES constitutes a structure that provides 
for learning through monitoring, at least at the European level. Through the process 
of guideline-development, NAPs, peer-review, and potentially also country specific 
recommendations issued by the Council, the EES institutionalises a feedback-loop 
that promotes an exchange of information and experience, and this iterative character 
is highlighted as one of the strategy’s major strengths (cf. Goetschy 2003; Trubek and 
Mosher 2003). The EES uses different techniques to pool information. It produces 
common standards of evaluation and comparison through the supply of European 
statistics, guidelines, Joint Employment Reports, as well as by encouraging member 
states to streamline their interpretation of the guidelines and to participate in the 
Mutual Learning Programme. Through all of these procedures, information is 
systematised and distributed (Jacobsson 2004). 
In addition to processes of benchmarking and pooling of information, there are signs 
that the EES also puts the principles of error detection into practice, seeing that 
member states also feel that they have contributed to the formation of EU-level 
                                                                                                                                           
15 The three social partners are the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre of Entreprises with Public Participation and of Entreprises of 
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policies. For instance, in Denmark there is a perception of Danish ideas being 
transmitted to the EU, and not so much the other way around (Jacobsson and Schmid 
2002a), and in France a similar opinion is prevalent (Coron and Palier 2002). This 
means that bottom-up information has also been taken into account, and practices 
have been changed accordingly. In addition, the continuous reforms and amendments 
of the EES serve as indicators of how the strategy is reconstituted in accordance with 
new problems and perspectives. In 2003 the replacements of the four pillars with 
three broader objectives were partly a result of complaints from member states on 
complexity and double work (Rhodes 2005). At the national level, some countries 
have succumbed to the pressure to alter the NAP time schedule so that consultations 
from non-governmental actors are gathered early enough to have a potential influence 
(GOVECOR 2004). 
With regard to simultaneous engineering, member states may be bound by the 
guidelines to a considerable degree, thus the leverage to experiment with goals and 
means concurrently is restricted within the framework of the EES (Ashiagbor 2005). 
Although it is difficult to establish to what degree member states feel compelled to 
comply with the EES, it seems to have established a normative framework that has 
more of a long-term policy effect by changing the perception of employment and 
social policies. For instance, some portray the EES as a compromise between a 
Nordic and a liberal model, illustrated by the overweight of recommendations 
directed at countries other than the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon member states 
(Smismans 2005a: 18).  The limited scope of simultaneous engineering is also added 
to by the governmental dominance of the process. By not including a broader range 
of actors such as local authorities or social partners that most likely possess valuable 
information, ministries and administrations prevent learning, and this enclosed 
character of the EES process weakens the outcome of the process. 
                                                                                                                                           
General Economic Interest (CEEP). 
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A similar problem is caused by the lack of coordination between policy areas. 
Interaction between governmental ministries has improved decision-making, but 
social partner involvement is most often confined to the area of employment. At the 
European level, the macro economic dialogue was supposed to provide an arena 
where the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank and the social 
partners could work together to improve the implementation of coordinated economic 
policy and thus facilitate the development of the labour market. However, the macro 
economic dialogue has been called the “neglected aspect of European employment 
policy” (Heise 2002)16. Thus, the goal of coordination between policy areas comes 
forward as a good intention rather than an actuality. This might improve as a result of 
the integration of the Employment Guidelines and the BEPGs, but at the same time, 
the studies I have referred to above also indicate that actors will present another 
obstacle.  
I have already mentioned how a lack of sanction mechanisms can obstruct the 
development of the EES- infrastructure, and this may also present a problem to the 
learning through monitoring process. Because of the EES’ “soft-law” character, it is 
more dependent on national acquiescence than “hard-law” policy backed by 
sanctions. For this reason, the open method has been suggested as an ideal test-case 
for the “power of deliberation” (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005: 216)17. In one of the few 
studies that actually try to analyse the deliberative imprint on the OMC-process, 
rather than declaring its potential, Jacobsson and Vifell (2005) found that in the 
committees associated with the EES, quality of arguments was generally decisive, as 
opposed to country size or resources. However, they also found that when stakes 
grew, nationality became more important, for example when the EMCO discussed 
recommendations. These debates proceeded in a negotiating manner with focus on 
wording and national standpoints, as well as an increased demand for written 
                                              
16 Another problem is the lack of connection between the EES and the European Social Fund (Watt 2004). They are 
supposed to address similar problems but end up as two isolated processes. Thus, two sets of actors work parallel with the 
same issues, only with occasional contact.    
17 “In order to be effective, the OMC must foster commitment to the common goals, and not just a superficial consensus 
with no real obligations involved – hence, actors must be convinced”. (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005: 223).  
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statements (ibid.)18. Furthermore, even if civil servants who work directly with the 
procedure may express a positive attitude towards the EES' learning potential and feel 
convinced by a particular policy, it is not automatically translated into national policy 
(ibid.).  
The mechanism of simultaneous engineering is intended to provide for autonomous 
decisions, but in the case of the Employment Strategy national engineering does not 
necessarily abide by the common framework. Although constrained by the EES, 
national processes come out as dominant vis-à-vis the EES, and the EU has no option 
but to trust the effect of “naming and shaming” to induce compliance. The EU can 
only gather and provide information to encourage learning; they cannot, however, 
make sure that the member states make use of this information, or that they even 
consider it when making their decisions. In sum, the EES is more or less based on the 
three central mechanisms of democratic experimentalism, benchmarking, error 
detection and simultaneously engineering, but if the normative framework it 
represents does not convince the member states to abide by the guidelines and the 
procedures, there is little the EU can do about it. However, the lack of coordination 
across units, whether it is problem solving bodies or policy areas, is not only 
problematic with regard to the efficiency of policy-making or the success of problem 
solving. Following the indicators of democratic experimentalism, it is also a 
democratic problem, because the crux of democratic governance is the connection 
between publics. Accordingly, in the next section, I explore the Employment Strategy 
using the set of experimentalist democratic indicators.  
4.3.3 Accountability 
What makes democratic experimentalism democratic is not direct participation or 
deliberation alone. Democracy requires that decision making processes are subjected 
to the full blast of diverse opinions and interests in society, and that they also shape 
                                              
18 This tendency that sensitive issues seemingly obstruct the process of deliberation in the EES-committees corresponds to 
what was pointed out in the previous section about the interdependence between national ideas and compliance with the 
EES.  
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ensuing decision-making. This means that five conditions have to be fulfilled: 
transparency, protection of basic rights, attention to reason-giving across and within 
units, accountability, and the individual right to contest decisions (Cohen and Sabel 
2003).  
With regard to transparency, the Employment Strategy shows ambiguous results. For 
instance, peer review processes in the EMCO are closed (Rhodes 2005), and its 
members express that they consider their own committee as rather closed to the 
outside public and actors (Smismans 2005a). Moreover, although the EMCO’s 
opinions are published, the preceding deliberations that would display the reasons 
given by different actors are not19. However, efforts have been made to improve 
transparency. In 2002, the Commission decided to make public their comprehensive 
5-year review of the Employment Strategy. Furthermore, in 2003 a website dedicated 
to the EES was established that publishes guidelines, indicators, NAPs, JERs and 
recommendations that earlier were spread around several other sites20, and this has 
allegedly increased the level of transparency (de la Porte and Nanz 2004).  
The EES-website also describes how the strategy emerged and how it has undergone 
numerous changes both with regard to content and procedure. Some observers have 
stated that the EES is so complex that it is difficult for actors not directly involved, to 
grasp the policy-making process (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005: 233). Complexity may 
also present a transparency problem because it renders the process opaque, and makes 
it more difficult to allocate responsibility. Consequently, the Convention on the 
Future of Europe considered that an incorporation of the Open Method of 
Coordination into the Constitutional Treaty would make the method more transparent 
and democratic by clarifying the procedures and the respective roles of those 
involved (Working Group XI, final Report 2003: 19). Hence, in addition to the 
constant changes to both procedure and substance, fuzziness with regard to 
competence and responsibility may make it more difficult for external actors to 
                                              
19 Meetings in the Economic and Financial Committee are not even documented (Jacobsson and Vifell 2005).  
20 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/index_en.htm
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follow and control the process, and hence make a contribution or criticize decisions. 
Evaluations of the EES conducted by the ETUC (2005) confirm this assumption, and 
conclude that the Employment Strategy has created favourable circumstances in 
terms of transparency and information to a certain degree, but that its multilevel 
structure presents a new obstacle. As a consequence, unions all over the EU have 
problems allocating actor responsibility, and on top of that, understanding their own 
role within the system (ibid.).  
A lack of transparency may also impede on the other democracy conditions, notably 
the requirement of due consideration of opinions across, as well as within, units. 
Although the sections above have displayed that compliance with the structure of the 
EES has not led to great results in terms of policy changes, at the national level, the 
EU’s employment policy has served as a source of affirmation and legitimation for 
national policy initiatives, both governmental and non-governmental. Issues like 
gender equality, lifelong learning, and the need for a more comprehensive approach 
to employment policy have benefited especially (GOVECOR 2004). There are also 
examples where politicians in opposition or trade unions have used the 
recommendations to their own country in making an argument (ibid.). Another 
example is provided by a report from France where national officials claim to have 
altered their original positions through participation in the EES because “it becomes 
an opportunity for a fresh re-reading which allows a “European version” (…) to 
emerge” (Coron and Palier 2002: 125). One way of conceiving these developments is 
that the shared standards constitute a legitimising framework that serves as a basis 
for, and can justify, criticism across national borders (Jacobsson 2004). In other 
words, despite the complexity of the process, it does constitute a frame of reference 
that allows for a comparison across units.  
The notion that the EES has established a normative framework is quite prevalent (cf. 
Syrpis 2002; Jacobsson 2004; Smismans 2005a). However, the use of the 
Employment Strategy as a “window of opportunity” is not widespread. In some 
cases, national governments seem almost to prevent the inclusion of other actors, but 
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governmental dominance is also combined with a general lack of knowledge about 
the Employment Strategy, apart from civil servants directly involved in the 
procedure. It is important to note that lack of knowledge, time, resources, interest, 
and initiative on part of the social partners are cited as reasons for low participation 
(GOVECOR 2004; ETUC 2005). Public administrators, national parliamentarians, 
local and regional actors, social partners, and civil society as well as journalists 
demonstrate a lack of awareness. On top of this, the broader public is practically 
unacquainted with the process (GOVECOR 2004). Very few studies have been made 
on the public debate about the EES, but in a study of media coverage in Britain, 
France and Germany, Meyer (2003) found that media attention had only declined 
since the founding of the EES (1997 to 2001). The practical upshot is a situation 
where governments rarely encourage the involvement of other actors, who on their 
part are both reluctant, and lack sufficient capacity to engage. Furthermore, neither 
the “excluded actors”, nor the media, seem to be preoccupied with the European 
Employment Strategy. This leads to the question of accountability. 
In chapter three, I assessed democratic experimentalism against four core elements of 
the public sphere. This examination demonstrated that experimentalism might with 
problems with regard to influence and accountability due to long chains of delegation 
and fuzzy lines of responsibility. The analysis of the EES partly confirms these 
concerns. Moreover, the problem is that transparency and an extensive exposure of 
the results of benchmarking processes through the publication of NAPs may make it 
easier to measure ends and means, but this does not amount to democratic 
accountability alone because it lacks a provision for more comprehensive citizens’ 
control (cf. Bovens 2006). While a lot of attention is given to procedures supposed to 
guarantee the exposure of member states’ performance, others actors, like the trade 
unions, have expressed doubts about the real goals of the EES (Watt 2004).  
The Lisbon strategy expressed the double goal of fostering both higher European 
competitiveness and better welfare, and although the EES is placed under the heading 
of “European social model”, employment is tightly intertwined with macro-economic 
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policy placed under “competetiveness” (Borràs and Jacobsson 2004). Prior to the 
2005 reform, the employment guidelines had to be consistent with the overall 
macroeconomic policy expressed in the BEPGs (Art. 128 par. 2), and now the two 
sets of guidelines are developed simultaneously. Although it is the member states 
themselves that set the specific targets according to their different needs (cf. 
Presidency Conclusions 2000), the guidelines are still concentrated around a 
particular understanding of what they are designed to accomplish. Thus, an effect of 
this normative framework is the establishment of conceptual borders “beyond which 
any alternative becomes increasingly more difficult to defend and even imagine” 
(Smismans 2005a: 18).  
Democratic experimentalism proceeds from the assumption that a society basically 
shares the same goals, thus it is relatively unproblematic to grant local actors the 
autonomy to settle on both goals and means (Cohen and Sabel 1997). Lowering the 
unemployment rate is probably a common goal for all members of the EU. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the means are also goals in themselves, such as a 
suggestion to increase the level of unemployment benefits to increase the living 
standard and motivation of individuals outside the labour market. The entanglement 
of goals and means can also cause political conflict, not simply the means 
themselves. Thus, the employment guidelines are not neutral devices, benchmarks are 
not manifestations of scientific facts, nor are indicators deduced in a scientific 
manner but rather “subject to political bargaining” (de la Porte and Pochet 2002: 33). 
Thus, democratic experimentalism may not be adept to accommodate the type of 
political conflict that originates from disagreement of principles.  
In addition, under the EES, citizens have little opportunity to influence the broad 
goals. Both the European Parliament and national parliaments are insufficiently 
involved, and in systems of multilevel governance, a national government can, 
especially in cases of opaque processes, easily play the blame game by claiming that 
another member state trumped its preferences (Papadopoulos 2006). Proponents of 
democratic experimentalism claim that elected officials will be held accountable for 
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the performance of both the “governing councils” and the “service providers” through 
election campaigns that publicise comparisons (Dorf and Sabel 1998). However, EU 
election campaigns are rarely committed to the comparison of performance between 
member states. They are nationally oriented and dominated by national actors (Hix 
2005). Moreover, as I pointed to above, the EES is seldom a topic for national debate. 
The right to contest decisions is one of the democratic conditions spelled out by 
democratic experimentalism, but in the case of the EES, it may be hard to exercise 
because only binding measures can be annulled (Smismans 2005b). This means that it 
is difficult to “directly challenge the guidelines for failing to respect fundamental 
rights” (ibid: 8) by bringing them before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Basic 
rights would probably be at less risk, as they are carefully protected by most member 
states, but it would be more difficult to claim a social or economic right unless the 
principles of the EES are adopted by national legislation or influence other policy 
areas where the Union has legislative competence (ibid.).    
Both a long chain of delegation and lack of legal regulation make it difficult for 
citizens to contest decisions. In addition, the above exploration has shown that the 
affected parties supposed to hold their governments accountable do not seem to be 
bothered about the EES. With limited resources available, the most rational strategy, 
whether for the trade unions or civil society, would be to try and influence the most 
powerful processes. Consequently, because the EES is regarded as a soft law 
measure, several believe it to be too weak an instrument to balance the large number 
of economic directives deriving from the European Commission (Trubek and Trubek 
2005). As a result, the lack of sanction mechanisms affects how political processes 
are perceived, and ultimately how well it performs both in terms of efficiency and 
democracy. EU institutions have no power to correct disobedience, and must rely on 
”naming and shaming”, but in order for this mechanism to work, the reputational cost 
of non-compliance must exceed the cost of conceding. The problem is, as we just 
have seen, that this effect is impaired by the low awareness of the EES in the member 
states, apart from actors directly involved. In short, there is no one to “name and 
shame”. 
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Some of the remarks above will also be discussed in the next chapter that compares 
the experimentalist perspective on the public sphere against that of government by 
law. Inter alia, they may serve to elaborate the point in chapter three about the core 
criteria acquiring different salience according to the form of institutional design they 
are incorporated into. First, however, I will sum up some of the main findings of this 
chapter, and point out the main implications for the development of a European 
public sphere.    
4.3.4 Contributions to the development of a public sphere 
By comparing the above findings to the four core elements that were elaborated in 
chapter two, triangular structure, openness, inclusiveness and influence, I will try to 
give some tentative conclusions about how the European Employment Strategy might 
contribute to developing a public sphere.  
The communication that takes place in the arenas of the EES is no doubt of public 
interest. However, Europeans seem to have enough with each of their own national 
labour market policies; they have neither the time nor sufficient interest to challenge 
these issues at the European level. The media show very little interest and this may 
also be aggravated by the complexity of the process and it occasional opacity. Taken 
together, this means that the Employment Strategy has a triangular structure, but the 
audience is not paying attention. From a public sphere perspective, this can be 
considered from two different angles – the input side on the one hand, and the output 
side on the other.   
On the input side, the inclusiveness of the EES process shows ambiguous results. 
Broad participation is encouraged by the Commission, but member states are hesitant 
to comply. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) deems that it has not 
gained sufficient access to the process, and this outcry resonates throughout the 
member states, or at least the “old” ones. At the same time, lower level as well as 
social partner participation appears to have increased with the EES, and it has become 
a point of reference for organisations of both governmental and civil society-origin. It 
is of course an open question whether or not these shared standards are constitutive of 
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new solidarities as indicated by experimentalism; nevertheless, they constitute a 
legitimising framework that serves as a basis for, and can justify, criticism across 
national borders (Jacobsson 2004). In other words, it may encourage the exchange of 
arguments across public spheres, and thus improve permeability. At the same time, 
this framework may have a restrictive function, as I pointed to above, by framing 
issues of employment in a certain manner which may prevent the consideration of 
information and arguments that do not “fit the picture”. Then again, the study of 
deliberation in the EMCO showed that the framework loses ground when participants 
discuss issues that are nationally sensitive, which also corresponds with the poor 
coordination of policies contradicting national ideas. For instance, despite receiving 
three recommendations to improve social partner participation, the Greek government 
has not yet changed its practice (de la Porte and Nanz 2004). Consequently, as is 
obvious from the above analysis, the lack of sanctioning power is a recurrent problem 
because the alternative mechanism of “naming and shaming” works poorly without 
attention from the broader public.  
It may seem like an overstatement to talk about threats to democracy if member states 
do not to comply with EES-policies, since the use of the open method is limited to 
particular policy areas. However, the EES has strongly influenced other parts of the 
EU labour law by shifting the focus from social to employment policy (Smismans 
2005b). Moreover, despite an unwillingness to comply, the EES has had a significant 
impact on the labour market, e.g., in terms of a “process of convergence around a 
growth-oriented macro-economic philosophy” (Ashiagbor 2005: 300). I have already 
shown that the trade unions are dissatisfied with the lack of inclusion in the 
coordinating work of policy areas. Some have even gone so far as to warn that this 
absence may undermine the input that the social partners have already made in the 
Luxembourg process, i.e. the EES (Foden and Magnusson 2002). It would probably 
be unwise to dismiss the Employment Strategy because it has not managed to secure 
a systematic coordination of concrete policy initiatives as of yet. Still, if merely 
because of its framing of normative standards, the EES produces problems of 
accountability.   
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This points to the issue of output. Studies of the Employment Strategy have shown 
that there is a clear development towards a common understanding of the challenges 
facing the EU, and that this has led to shared definition of problems, and also a 
general accord on how to approach these problems (GOVECOR 2004). The problem 
is that although social partners, civil society organisations and citizens’ movements 
were all part of producing this framework, this would not mean that the outcome is 
accountable. It would demonstrate a high degree of responsiveness, but that is not 
necessarily the same as accountability (Bovens 2006). Democratic accountability 
requires in addition that citizens can sanction decision-makers, and as I have just 
shown, there is not an abundance of effective sanctioning possibilities inherent in the 
EES. Thus, if the organisationally dispersed public spheres that are depicted by 
democratic experimentalism are to escape isolation, it has to be assured that the 
public sphere can gather at an aggregated level both to form comprehensive public 
opinion and demand justifications of broad goals.   
In sum, this means that it is difficult to conclude that the hypothesis that the open 
method character of the EES contributes to the development of a European public 
sphere. The Employment Strategy is a rather well kept secret. It is also more 
administrative than political, and the member states seem quite content with the 
situation. Part of the explanation may be the soft law-character of the EES and the 
lack of sanction mechanisms at its disposal. At the same time, the fact that the EES 
appears to be challenged by different structural constraints does not mean that it has 
to be written off as ineffective. Democratic experimentalism calls attention to the 
nascent infrastructure and the development of a normative frame of reference, which 
demonstrates that there is a potential for the EES in generating a public sphere, 
assuming that the potential for a common concern represented by the Employment 
Strategy is perceived as such. Furthermore, the EES serves as an example of the type 
of institutional design for the public sphere envisioned by experimentalists.   Against 
this backdrop, in the following chapter I will explore the particular institutional 
design they propose by comparing it to Habermas’ government-by-law model. 
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5. Experimentalism and government by law 
In chapter three I assessed the democratic attributes of the experimentalist public 
sphere. One of the things that became apparent was that the core criteria – a triangular 
structure, openness, inclusiveness, and influence – acquire different salience 
according to the institutional conditions designed to uphold them. Thus, in this 
chapter, I will take a closer look at the institutional design proposed by democratic 
experimentalism by comparing it to Habermas’ government-by-law model. The 
reason for doing this is that these two models represent different ideal types, 
especially in institutional terms. Secondly, several experimentalists have used 
Habermas’ model to illustrate why their democratic model is more advanced. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis is that the experimentalist institutional design is a 
reasonable alternative to the government by law model. It is important to underline 
that the following analysis is a normative assessment; the current design does not 
constitute a basis for determining which model contributes the most to the 
development of a European public sphere.   
Both democratic experimentalism and Habermas’ more traditional conception of 
democracy have a similar core, namely that of deliberative democracy; they both 
regard that legitimate decisions issue “from the public deliberation of citizens” 
(Bohman and Regh 1997: ix). Both also assign a principal role to the state apparatus 
and acknowledge its importance for the democratic functioning of the public sphere. 
This means that they recognise that central institutions are fundamental for reasons of 
control, sanction and organisation (cf. Habermas 1996a; Dorf and Sabel 1998). 
However, as I will demonstrate below, the differences between the two models are 
more frequent than the similarities. Moreover, these differences have implications for 
both the form and function of the public sphere. This rests largely on the different 
institutional designs represented by the theories, which can be arranged according to 
two dimensions. First of all, there is a divide between how they conceive of rights, 
defined by Habermas as the foundations of the public sphere (1962/ 1989). 
Democratic experimentalism depicts rights as “inevitably experimentalist”, meaning 
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historically contingent and linked to identity (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 452). Habermas, 
on the other hand, regards rights as internally connected with popular sovereignty 
expressed though the medium of constitutional law.  Thus, while democratic 
experimentalism views rights as contingent on political processes, Habermas would 
assert that the political process itself is constituted by a system of rights that if trifled 
with, would eliminate the foundations of a legitimate political system (Habermas 
1996a). This divergence on the conceptualisation of rights is also closely connected 
to the second dimension – the separation of powers and competences. To Habermas, 
the separation of powers is essential to the constitutionality and legitimacy of the 
state. It is also closely connected to the division of competences between state and 
society, i.e. the decision-making centre and the public sphere. Conversely, democratic 
experimentalism sees the traditional separation of powers as a barrier towards 
efficient policies because it is equivalent with the imposition of uniform measures. 
Instead, an idea of constitutionalism is promoted, where means and ends are decided 
concomitantly, unrestrained by a rigid constitution and an impeding division of 
competence (Cohen and Sabel 2003). In sum, these two dimensions constitute two 
very different designs for the public sphere. Below, I will compare democratic 
experimentalism to the government by law model to see what the former has to offer 
in constituting a reliable institutional framework for the public sphere.    
5.1 Rights 
Democratic experimentalism does not leave rights at the will of popular fancy. 
Although rights are seen as dependent on historical processes, this implies that they 
have demonstrated their reasonableness and survived historical changes. During 
debate, references to rights that are regarded as ‘constitutional’, i.e. fundamental to 
the democratic procedure itself, have precedence over reasons categorised as 
‘political’. Constitutional reasons have a deliberative prerogative because they cannot 
“permissibly be denied” since they manifest the “standing of citizens as free and 
equal” (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 327-8). In other words, constitutional reasons make 
democracy manifest, while political reasons are not democratically indispensable and 
can therefore be legitimately contested. Furthermore, Cohen and Sabel underline that 
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a fundamental requirement of democratic experimentalism is that claims backed by 
constitutional reasons must be given “stringent protection” (ibid.). The question is 
what will be protected, who are going to protect these claims, and how they will be 
protected. The two latter questions will be treated in the section below on separation 
of powers, while the question of “what” refers to rights and will be addressed first 
because it serves as a background for the issue of institutional design of the public 
sphere. If one accepts that a theory of rights should “make possible the construction 
of rights-respecting institutions” (McKinnon 2003: 18), then the two approaches can 
be divided according to how they protect rights, but this is also interdependent with 
how one conceives of the status and development of rights. 
To Habermas, what makes an action norm valid is its acceptance through rational 
discourse by all those affected by it (Habermas 1996a). Thus, the principle of popular 
sovereignty is the basis of legitimate law, and popular sovereignty presupposes the 
existence of basic rights that guarantee the private and public autonomy of citizens, 
i.e. guarantee their basic liberty rights, legal status, and legal protection, as well as 
access to political participation and hence self-legislation (ibid.). In addition to the 
protection and provision of living conditions that will allow citizens to utilise the 
above rights, this sums up Habermas’ “system of rights” that denotes the framework 
of legitimate regulation of collective will-formation. In other words, they express the 
“rights citizens must confer on one another if they want to legitimately regulate their 
interactions and life contexts by means of positive law” (ibid: 122). Finally, this 
explains why the constitutional state is inter-reliant on democracy: the former needs 
the latter to be valid, while the latter needs the former to be realised in a legitimate 
manner21.  
                                              
21 The experimentalist divide between constitutional and political reasons appears to resemble the divide that 
Habermas makes between norms and values, where norms refer to some higher-order principle while values 
signify “more or less particular forms of life” (Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 134). However, to Habermas, moral 
norms depend on, and are co-original, with law, because morality is not a basis for action but only tells us what 
is right and just. On the other hand, morality legitimates the law because a decision is not legitimate through 
mere legality; it needs the legitimation of self-legislating citizens and must thus be submitted to a test of 
communicative reasoning to determine “whether (...) aims are in accordance with moral insights” (ibid: 137). 
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By contrast, according to Dorf and Sabel, it is a paradox that despite a general 
recognition of rights as historically contingent, this has “only served to reinforce 
commitments to the centrality of rights” (1998: 448). This does not mean that rights 
contradict the idea of experimentalism, which would be a plausible inference given 
that everything can be experimented with as long as decisions are justified. Because 
decisions are not made by rational consensus, majority decisions are unavoidable, and 
although the process of reason-giving is thought to sweeten the defeat and increase 
the level of acceptance, one could imagine a situation where one constitutional reason 
was trumped by another constitutional reason, resulting in a serious regress for 
minorities.  
However, Dorf and Sabel oppose this line of criticism by explaining that although 
experimentalist rights are not rights in the foundational sense – they are not “real” – 
they still have a special status because they are “part of who we are” (1998: 448ff). 
Not only are rights “preconditions of humanity”, they are also developed through 
history, and are thus entrenched in our collective self-understanding. Moreover, the 
centrality of rights to “our” identity is confirmed by their persistence despite “the 
discovery that rights at the most abstract level are not “real” in the sense of having 
firm foundations”. Therefore, a phenomenon like slavery will never be reintroduced 
as an experiment, but only because we come to learn that “the constitutional 
prohibition of it rests on the interpretation (...) of certain norms (...) rather than on 
universal rights revealed to out forbearers and forever fixed in principle” (ibid: 458).  
Featuring in democratic experimentalism, deliberation is democratic as long as it is 
exposed to the five full-blast conditions that inter alia include the protection of basic 
rights as well as the right to contest decisions. Imagine that a law has been adopted at 
state level that declares the equal right to adequate education. One local unit has 
found out that granting extra funds to schools with over 60 percent pupils of language 
minority background comes closer to the right to adequate education. Subsequently, it 
obtains the highest score on an ensuing national benchmarking process. The 
information is spread to other local units, but they all choose to go on as usual with 
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equal funding to all schools. In each of these other units, only a minority of the pupils 
would benefit, and as a consequence their parents who participate in decision-making 
processes on their behalf are also a minority. Their voices may be heard but without 
any practical effect. According to Dorf and Sabel, it would “defeat the purpose” if the 
national legislature were to impose an equal funding rule to all schools (1998: 455), 
because the purpose is to allow local jurisdictions to decide on goals and means 
appropriate to their local setting. My point here is not to argue that every problem can 
and should be solved by adopting a new right. Rather it is to show that the potential 
problem with such “framework rights”, i.e. rights that are open to extensive 
interpretation, is that the rights a person has may be very dependent on where she or 
he resides. Consequently, an arbitrary interpretation of rights may also lead to 
inequalities. Another example is provided by looking at the European Employment 
Strategy (EES), which is unlikely to protect fundamental social rights unless it is able 
to influence national or European law. Instead the main challenge is allegedly to 
incorporate the language of rights into the content of the EES so that they become a 
part of the benchmarking process (Smismans 2005b). Nevertheless, the success of 
such a rights-programming of the EES would still be susceptible to voluntary 
compliance.  
The question is how Cohen’s democratic process, which recognises the freedom and 
equality of all, resolves a conflict of rights? For instance, education could be regarded 
as a prerequisite for the exercise of fundamental civil rights. Imagine a situation 
where a poor minority argues that special attention to schooling is needed to 
compensate for disadvantaging social background. Moreover, they could argue that it 
is a common good that the educational level is high; for instance, it would tend to 
heighten the quality of democracy, and without affirmative action, chances are high 
that their groups will remain low on education and consequently also on participation. 
Everyone appreciates this argument as relevant and acceptable. However, the 
majority finds that such special attention would reduce the quality of the overall 
education. Both reasons could claim constitutionality; the problem is which one to 
choose as a basis for actual policy making, and how to make that choice. A related 
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question is whether the divide between constitutional and political reasons as 
straightforward as it may seem. In the above example, imagine for the sake of 
argument that some claimed that affirmative action within education is not a 
constitutional, but a political matter. As a result, affirmative action would not require 
stringent protection. However, others would still claim that their reasons for 
supporting affirmative measures refer to constitutional rights. Without suggesting that 
this question is easy to resolve within a system following the principles of 
government-by-law, it seems to me that democratic experimentalism makes it even 
more complicated and considerably more arbitrary, due to its emphasis on 
voluntariness.  
At the same time, the principles of freedom and equality are not meant to protect 
rights by themselves, because any rights-infringement is, as I pointed out above, 
protected by a historically developed identity where basic rights have come to be 
understood as a precondition for humanity. Moreover, a basic premise for the model 
of democratic experimentalism is the assumption that “citizens – despite conflicts on 
interest and political outlook – agree very broadly on priorities and goals” (Cohen 
and Sabel 1997: 326). Experimentalists claim that heterogeneity is beneficial because 
it increases the number of outlooks on a given issue and hence the number of possible 
solutions, but at the same times “the participants must (…) share a view about 
relevant reasons” (ibid: 333). Compared to Habermas, the development and 
justification of rights along the lines of democratic experimentalism merges two 
discourses that he describes as operating according to two different logics.  
There seems to be a tension between the experimentalist deliberative procedure and 
the common ground conception of rights. A focus on common ground as the basis for 
rights would denote what Habermas (1996) describes as an ‘ethical-political 
discourse” clarifying a shared form of life and self-understanding. On the other hand, 
constitutional reasons refer to universal standards descriptive of ‘moral discourses’. 
Of course, in the real world different types of discourses appear concurrently and not 
side by side, but in case of conflict they could yield different results. Ethical 
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discourse generates arguments based on “the description of identity-shaping 
traditions (...) combined with the normative projection of an exemplary way of life 
justified through reflection on, and evaluation of, its formative processes” (ibid: 161). 
Moral discourse, on the other hand, is based entirely on “how we can regulate our 
common life in the equal interest of all” (ibid.). Thus, the former is not equipped to 
resolve questions of rights because rights have a universal orientation.  
Although democratic experimentalism does not rest on a particular version of the 
good life, the history of the collective appears to gain precedence over morality. This 
does not mean that democratic experimentalism suffers the same problems a pure 
republican model by “neglect[ing] the differentiated character of politics” (Eriksen 
and Weigård 2003: 120), as its proponents are explicit about the fact of reasonable 
pluralism (cf. Cohen 1999). Rather it is their pragmatist point of departure that causes 
trouble, because morality, in the Habermasian sense where it contributes to legitimise 
the law, seems reduced to a matter of consequence. In their delineation of 
experimentalist rights, Dorf and Sabel explain why it would be “untenable” to 
separate two levels of rights – one that pertains to local decision-making, and one that 
includes traditional constitutional safeguards (1998: 444ff). Ultimately, it is the 
experimentalist restructuring of the political system, and more particularly, “a new 
understanding of the separation of powers [that] will reshape thinking about 
individual constitutional rights as well”. More specifically how this comes into play 
will be addressed below.  
The upshot of these different rights-approaches may seem predominantly theoretical. 
However, even if history would suffice as the ultimate rights-respecting institution, 
there would still be practical consequences of the rights’ emergent character. Basic 
rights guarantee the existence of the public sphere because they ensure citizens’ 
private and public autonomy. Allowing experimentalism the capability of protecting 
basic rights, the problem remains that rights must be regarded as constitutional in 
order for them to be given “stringent protection” (cf. page 57). As a consequence, the 
question is not whether experimentalism can assure a right to participation, but if it is 
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able to protect the private autonomy of citizens in a process of benchmarking. Basic 
rights are fundamental in the sense that they have been benchmarked “all the way up” 
(Cohen and Sabel 2003).  However, they still have an emergent character, and even if 
they are not under constant revision, it is still reasonable to ask the question of how 
anyone can appeal to rights “in progress”.   
By contrast, Habermas’ system of rights incorporates “guaranteed legal remedies 
through which any person who feels that her rights have been infringed can assert her 
claims” (1996a: 125). Moreover, specific rights are expressed through law; thus 
citizens can make the claim that their rights have been violated by referring to a legal 
basis. Under an experimentalist regime, however, rights cannot be claimed isolated 
from an adjustment of goals to means. This heavily increases the burden of proof on 
part of the rights claimant, especially if she cannot back up her claim by asserting 
constitutionality, or that “who we are” demands the provision of policies according to 
rights. However, this provokes the question that I also have asked in the two 
preceding chapters, namely who is allowed to participate in framing certain issues or 
in the case of the Employment Strategy, in creating the cognitive framework it 
generates. This will also be further elaborated below.  
In sum, even though it would be overstated to say that democratic experimentalism 
sustain a republican tradition equal, it seems reasonable to introduce a similar caveat, 
notably that individual rights stands in danger of being surrendered to the will of the 
majority (Habermas 1996b). In what follows, I will demonstrate that this might also 
be exacerbated by the emergent character of the separation of powers and division of 
competences.      
5.2 Division of power and competence 
According to democratic experimentalism, both rights and the separation of powers 
emerge from the actual political process. This is one of the main characteristics of the 
democratic quality of democratic experimentalism – to assure that neither structures 
nor content are decided prior to the consideration of goals in relations to means. In 
the words of Cohen and Sabel (2003: 369): “[W]ithout free expression, there is no 
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democracy; but the elaboration of the content of that right in light of alternative 
specifications is part of democracy’s work”. Immediately, this does not conflict with 
Habermas’ conception of a system of rights, which is only meant as a set of principles 
that “justify categories of rights”, but are “prior to concrete laws and rights”, in the 
sense that they are not equivalent to positive law (Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 150-1). 
However, as the examination above indicated, the two theories represent divergent 
perspectives on the development of such concrete rights; due largely to the different 
importance allocated the rule of law. While democratic experimentalism assigns 
primary legitimacy to the principles that arise from actual communication within the 
boundaries of respect for freedom and equality, Habermas conceives of political 
power as legitimated by law. Law’s connection to politics as well as to the state 
apparatus makes the use of state power “predictable, neutral and fair” (Poggi 1978, 
quoted in Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 179). Combined with the constitutional 
provision for the separation of powers and the institutionalisation of the public 
sphere, the law secures the principle of freedom and the exercise of popular 
sovereignty.  
Before I move on to the comparison of experimentalism to government by law, it is 
important to understand Habermas’ depiction of the relation between the law, the 
public sphere, and the division of powers. The exercise of political power is 
connected to law because it needs legitimating, and only the law can provide this type 
of legitimation because it has been adopted through legitimate procedures. The 
legitimacy of this procedure is based on the exposure of decisions to the public 
sphere, where they are subjected to the principles of communicative reason – 
deciding whether or not decisions are in accordance with moral insights. 
Furthermore, the public sphere is not only a critical player, it is also a source of 
legitimate power in the sense that policies should essentially emanate from 
communicative procedures in the public sphere. Both directly, and indirectly through 
mediating actors such as political parties, citizens influence decision-making through 
participating in the public sphere where issues can be brought up and tested with 
regard to whether or not they deserve public attention (Eriksen and Weigård 2003). 
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Finally, within the decision-making complex, policies are measured against a broader 
set of demands, e.g. political programmes, legal principles, established rights, 
precedence etc., before being implemented. Through the institution of this “political 
circuit”, the goal is to remedy asymmetrical powers. In other words, it checks that 
“resource-based power which exists in civil society is not converted into collective 
decisions until it has been tried by norm-testing reason” (ibid: 172-3). Against this 
backdrop, in what follows I will try to contextualise the above discussion about rights 
by focusing on two elements that conjure different institutional designs for both the 
form of the public sphere and its democratic function, notably the separation of 
powers and the division of roles between state and society.     
The locus of the difference between the public sphere perspectives of Habermas and 
democratic experimentalism is that the latter assumes that means and ends are 
mutually defining, and that this should be recognised by not fixing any of them prior 
to an actual political process. In the words of Cohen and Sabel (2003: 368), 
“understanding the content of ends requires inquiring into means, and (…) 
understanding the content of means requires inquiring into ends”. I have previously 
described the institutional changes this model prescribes; nevertheless, I will give a 
short repetition here. Democratic experimentalists have no intention of eradicating 
traditional institutions like elections, legislatures, courts, executives. However, they 
are assigned new roles. Legislatures, through a realisation of their incapability to 
solve problems, take on the task of providing for local arenas of problem solving. 
More specifically, their job is to work out general goals, to assist and make resources 
available to local units, and afterwards review their work (Cohen and Sabel 1997). 
Administrative agencies become responsible for spreading information among the 
local units, while the courts are to make sure that the procedures advance in a 
democratic experimentalist way, i.e. “to require that problem-solvers themselves 
make policy with express reference both to constitutional and relevant policy 
reasons” (ibid: 335).   
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First of all, advocates of democratic experimentalism are well aware of the criticism 
they will face by suggesting that the separation of powers should emerge according to 
context, combined with a “fourth, administrative branch of recent pedigree and 
uncertain democratic legitimacy” (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 438ff). Nevertheless, they 
claim that their changes of the institutional architecture will not lead to tyranny, and 
that the administrative agencies, because they feed on direct deliberation by citizen 
users, are “the least dangerous branch of democratic experimentalism”. Since service 
units are coordinating the expertise of other units and not making policies themselves, 
the principal-agent problem that is a result of the separation of powers (ibid.) is 
allegedly resolved. In this manner, citizens become self-legislators directly and not 
indirectly through elected representatives. One intention of this particular design is 
thus to enhance democracy by instituting direct participation. The other side is that 
decisions made in these sub-jurisdictions supposedly become more rational by 
adapting solutions to the local perception of what the problem is. Since those 
participating in the decision-making process have first-hand knowledge of the 
problem, the information basis becomes more accurate, and because diverse 
information is promoted, the problem is elucidated from several angles through 
deliberative processes.  
However, as I pointed to in the analysis of the European Employment Strategy as 
well as in the assessment of democratic experimentalism against the core elements of 
the public sphere, discarding a strict separation of powers as a principle for state rule 
may quickly result in problems of accountability. This is especially the case if a 
policy-making is not open to revision despite better arguments. Although advocates 
of democratic experimentalism claim that their framework promotes accountability 
and responsiveness (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 320), my counterclaim is that despite the 
best intentions, they are not able to resolve the principal-agent dilemma; instead they 
exacerbate the problem by not recognising the citizens’ role as principals. I will try to 
show why and how by pointing to two closely associated tensions that are inherent in 
democratic experimentalism, notably that between responsiveness and accountability, 
and that between Socratic and democratic accountability.  
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The need to distinguish between responsiveness and accountability has already been 
mentioned above, and if one accepts that accountability equals the availability of 
sanction mechanisms, then the disparity between responsiveness and accountability 
can be described as two different forms of responsibility where the former refers to 
standards of responsible behaviour, while the latter refers to ex-post account giving 
(Bovens 2006). By instituting direct deliberation in local units, democratic 
experimentalism would probably obtain a high score in an evaluation of 
responsiveness. Although they are far from indifferent to the issue of accountability – 
remember that this is to be obtained through the exchange of information between 
units – the benchmarking procedure is still only an instrument supposed to reveal 
different levels of performance and thus make local units adapt to best practice. If for 
instance an OMC-procedure were established on fundamental rights, as some have 
suggested (cf. Smismans 2005b), a “best practice-right” would be found on a 
continuum of no right to perfect compliance, contingent on the practices of the 
member states22. But would such a procedure not only add to the problem of 
arbitrariness, as rights remain the “victim” of the preferences of the member states 
without an institutionalised protection? Even if rights make up a separate OMC, or 
are incorporated into an open method-process like the Employment Strategy, it would 
still be difficult to contest broad goals or guidelines on the grounds that they are in 
breach with rights, as the European Court of Justice can only annul binding measures. 
Conversely, democratic experimentalists reject uniform measures because they 
cannot fulfil the requirements of diversity and volatility. In a setting of 
organisationally dispersed public spheres connected by an accommodating centre, 
this begs the question of how citizens will be able to contest decisions. Following the 
experimentalist line of thought, benchmarks are elaborated by administrative agencies 
that administer the broad goals set by elected officials. However, as I tried to show in 
chapter three, the distance between the principals (the citizens), and the agents (the 
                                              
22 Another question is how these benchmarks are elaborated. For instance, are quantitative or qualitative measures the best 
way to determine progress in employment policies?   
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local service providers), makes accounting and sanctioning difficult. Long chains of 
delegation blurs the lines of transparency, added to by the complexity of an 
organisationally dispersed process, whether in a vertical or horizontal sense. On the 
one hand, it becomes difficult for citizens to use their vote as an influential 
instrument, and on the other it is hard to identify the responsible actors.  
The apparent precedence of broad participation over consequence is closely 
connected to the form of accountability that I find to hold prominence in democratic 
experimentalism, and which becomes apparent by distinguishing between Socratic 
and democratic accountability (Chambers 2004). While the former refers to the 
quality of the reasons that are presented to defend a certain decision, the latter refers 
to its legitimacy: “[w]e might say that the Socratic element stresses the rationality of 
public reason while the democratic element stresses the public nature of public 
reason” (ibid: 391). By emphasising the epistemic benefit of deliberative democracy, 
much weight is placed on realising the former type of accountability; thus, for 
instance, in a deliberative setting, reasons must be explicit, all relevant reasons must 
be given due consideration and so on (Cohen and Sabel 1997). Thus, both plans and 
procedures are benchmarked according to how they perform, and simultaneously 
exposed to a public. The question is whether this way of instituting deliberation can 
ensure that decisions are made according to public reasons, i.e. legitimately. In other 
words, can the experimentalist institutional architecture ensure that the preferences of 
citizens and groups in possession of superior resources or particular status are not 
transformed into policy unchecked?      
By contrast, a governmental perspective on the processes in the public sphere aims to 
secure that public opinion is filtered through the system of legitimate law-making 
before being put into practice. Thereby, it constitutes a channel of democratic 
accountability not only because it retains a divide between state and society, as I will 
return to below, but because the procedures that have to be followed in order to make 
legitimate decisions are based on the separation of powers. Without disregarding the 
asymmetrical relation between principal and agents, administrative agencies are 
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nevertheless responsible to the legislatures because they operate within a set of rules. 
Of course, experimentalist service units do not act solely on their own, because their 
capacity to do so is constrained by the duty to supply information and have that 
information assessed by the court according to the principles of directness and 
deliberation, i.e. that decisions have taken both constitutional and political reasons 
properly into account. However, combined with what was just said about the lack of 
accountability of the overarching framework, the problem is; how can courts decide 
what proper consideration is without contributing to law-making themselves? 
Following the principles of democratic experimentalism, rulings in the courtroom are 
not understood as a basis for ensuing legislation; nevertheless, courts will still give 
rulings on what they consider to be the best procedure. How can this ruling be made 
accountable to the public if parliamentary legislation is reduced to a minimum, and 
constitution-making is emergent? The point is that a parliament is not only a site for 
decision-making and control; it is also an institution with symbolic value, and its 
importance may be “less dependent upon its ability to initiate, modify or veto policies 
than upon its ability to convey signals, moods and impressions and to make others 
take its interpretations into account” (Olsen 1983: 39). From such a perspective, the 
parliament is essential to the functioning of the public sphere also because it provides 
principled directions.    
Consider again some of the points that were stressed in the analysis of the European 
Employment Strategy, notably the trade unions’ scepticism towards the “real goals” 
of the EES. Although citizens will be able to directly influence their own everyday 
lives by participating in the public spheres designed by democratic experimentalism, 
their chances of influencing the framework that shape this activity may be smaller. 
Dependent on the question of how general the purposes that are decided by national 
legislatures are, the effect of participating in general elections nevertheless seems 
miniscule. Broad goals serve the purpose of allowing for local level simultaneous 
decisions on goals and means; however in terms of principle, these are often not easy 
to separate. Thus, the danger is that local autonomy results in arbitrariness because 
the provision and quality of services is dependent on where one lives. Moreover, the 
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particular services provided by a given local unit are further dependent on its 
performance in the benchmarking process against more or less successful projects. To 
a certain extent this is the case also in traditional political systems, because local and 
regional authorities are at liberty to set their own policies, but in most nation states, 
the central demands of uniformity have a much greater scope and depth. Combined 
with weakened abilities to contest decisions, or more specifically, the grounds for 
doing so, it is reasonable to ask whether the institutional design that democratic 
experimentalists intend to make local units take each other’s opinions into account is 
strong enough to prevent a multitude of self-referential public spheres. 
In the case of the EU, each member state has of course a greater leverage to decide its 
own policies, and considered as a local unit, citizens have the opportunity to appeal to 
their national governments to contest a decision. However, if a decision is made at the 
European level, the principle of democratic legitimacy requires that citizens can 
direct their demands to the European authorities, at least if one rejects the idea that 
European policies are sufficiently legitimised by national governments. The logic 
behind this constraint is that legitimacy should be awarded decisions at the same level 
as they are taken (Beetham and Lord 1998). Democratic experimentalism, however, 
is not too preoccupied with the more comprehensive form of democratic legitimacy. 
This is demonstrated by the analysis of the reasoning behind the emergent separation 
of powers, as well as by the performance of the theory in practice where the broad 
framework of the Employment Strategy is taken for granted and only used as a point 
of departure for the unfolding of experimentalist dynamics.  
To sum up, as a result of the experimentalist emphasis on fluid structures and the 
removal of the traditional division of labour, the activities in the comprehensive 
public sphere change character because the flexibility of the public sphere itself 
borders on instability. This is not the result of a constant reconstitution, but rather of 
how it is constituted. On the one hand, it is fragmented according to functionality23, 
                                              
23 This is not only a normative choice, but can also be seen as the result of a functionality and differentiation is a 
requirement of a modern state (cf. Trenz and Eder 2004).  
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and on the other, it surrounds a state structure stripped of most of its powers. Thus, as 
I have tried to show above, it becomes more difficult to know where to direct 
criticism and from whom to demand justification and accountability. Taken to the 
limit, every locally participating citizen can be held accountable. I will return to the 
issue of fragmentation and functionality shortly, but first this needs some explication 
because the problems that arise when decisions are made locally lead towards the 
second dimension that demarcate the experimentalist and government perspectives on 
the public sphere, namely that of separation between state and society. Again, my 
assertion is that the democratic experimentalist focus on ensuring responsiveness 
obstructs the role of the public sphere as a critical institution. 
According to Cohen and Sabel (1997), the public sphere is heterogeneous and 
organisationally dispersed, and every public constituted around a common problem 
must be allowed to decide on both goals and means simultaneously. Conversely, 
Habermas argues that a strict separation must be kept between state and society 
where the former has both decision-making and opinion-making powers while 
society only retains the former. As a consequence, democratic experimentalists 
accuse Habermas of stripping popular sovereignty of power, while Habermas on the 
other hand maintains that that the public sphere must be kept distant from the 
corrupting power of the state (1996a). At first glance, it is an appealing thought that 
citizens are able to exercise direct influence on the matters that concern them the 
most, and subsequently put their decisions to the broader test of the entire citizenry. 
However, it also points back to the question posed above, namely whether 
experimentalism can ensure that differences in economic and class-based resources 
are not decisive for the outcome of a political process. I have already demonstrated 
that this may present a problem at an aggregated level due to problems of 
accountability and the potential lack of citizens’ influence over broad goals, but the 
point I would like to make here is that with so much power allocated to local units, it 
increases the vulnerability of groups that possess less social power than others, either 
in terms of material resources and rhetorical skills.  
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Cohen (1989) confirms that he finds material inequalities an important cause of 
political inequalities and suggests initiatives like party funding to redeem the 
problem. However, is this consistent with the general focus on local decision-making 
comprising both means and principles? In short, what is the use of funding political 
parties if they are stripped of their main sources of powers through the weakening of 
governmental office? The problem of inequality is also aggravated by the functional 
character of the local units, i.e. the instrumentality of the public spheres. As I pointed 
out in chapter three, access to a decision making unit may depend on the knowledge 
one possesses24, but also on points of view. It is surely easier to make a decision the 
fewer people that disagree with problem definition and premises. For instance, one 
could speculate that given the time-pressure that governments are put under by the 
European Employment Strategy, it is easier to omit actors from civil society and 
social partners that could generate disagreement. This necessity of “governability” is 
closely connected to the functional character of the public spheres that are generated 
by the governance process, but in addition to problems like accountability, which is 
problematic enough in terms of democracy, it also begets the question of whether 
functional public spheres permit the expression of citizens’ public autonomy. By 
contrast, Habermas envisions a public sphere that is sensitive to all questions 
precisely because it is not required to make a concrete decision (Eriksen and Weigård 
2003).  
As I pointed to in chapter three, “governable” public spheres may leave little room 
for opinions that cannot be hinged to the practical problem on the agenda. In other 
words, the agenda-setting powers of the public sphere could be diminished. 
According to Habermas, such “arranged publics” are less susceptible to “new ways of 
looking at problems than with justifying the selection of a problem and the choice 
among competing proposals for solving it” (1996a: 307). Furthermore, the 
comprehensive public sphere also acquires an instrumental character if its task is to 
                                              
24 According to democratic experimentalism, groups with special knowledge might be awarded special rights to 
participation (Cohen and Sabel 1997).    
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ensure the comparison of performance across units. Thus, the upshot might be that 
the room for addressing principal issues shrinks, as well as the opportunity for 
citizens to decide amongst themselves which issues that deserve public attention, and 
thus generate public opinion. In sum, as a result of participative empowerment of 
citizens, the activities of civil society and the public sphere are more focused on 
problem solving and less on political supervision and steering. Combined with the 
potentially weakened role of parliaments not only as law-makers but also as carriers 
of principled influence, it is difficult to understand where a principled debate will 
take place in an experimentalist society, not to mention the debate about whether or 
to what extent concrete policies match these principles. 
Furthermore, it is important to ask whether democratic experimentalism may be 
overburdening its citizens. They are taking over the role of professional politicians 
who on the one hand might be vulnerable to the accusations of detachment, but on the 
other are in positions that allow a comprehensive consideration of reasons and 
resources. Direct democracy demands a lot from citizens, and may aggravate 
inequalities rather than balance interests if access to decision-making is conditioned 
on knowledge or opinions, as I mentioned above, or even through self-selection. One 
could probably remedy this latter aspect by actively recruiting participants from 
certain groups, but this also brings about the question of administrative 
overburdening. Courts, legislatures and agencies are awarded the difficult task of 
providing for local problem solving and supervising this procedure in detail. Thus, 
the question is whether democratic experimentalism actually implies a larger and 
more complex administrative system than the one it starts out criticising.       
Of course, I do not mean to suggest that democratic experimentalists are wholly naive 
and unrealistic, but my impression is that there are a lot of challenges, especially with 
regard to democracy, that are left unanswered. On the whole, I think it is safe to say 
that democratic experimentalists have spent more time on working out the possible 
benefits of problem solving of experimentalism, than on how it can be realised 
through actual, democratic institutions, hence the focus on responsiveness and 
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Socratic accountability. As a result, the hypothesis that democratic experimentalism 
is a reasonable alternative to the government-by-law model, is not strengthened by 
the above analysis. At the same time, it is equally important to underline that I am not 
suggesting that Habermas’ perspective on the public sphere is superior in all respects 
or flawless as an analytical instrument or normative model. In fact, the above 
comparison also calls attention to some of its weaker points, e.g. with depicting the 
public sphere as an arena with no formal powers surrounding the governmental 
decision-making complex. These last points will be elaborated below.  
In this chapter, I have focused mainly on the challenges that the public sphere 
perspective of democratic experimentalism faces due to an institutional design that 
seems to generate arenas for fragmented rather than comprehensive communication. 
In the following, concluding chapter, I will sum up the assessment of what 
experimentalism has to offer in the study of the European public sphere both from an 
analytical and normative perspective, and then say something about how institutional 
aspects of the EU may contribute to the development of a European public sphere.   
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6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have used the democratic experimentalist model to explore how 
institutional aspects of the EU contribute to the development of a European public 
sphere. My approach has been threefold. First, I assessed the democratic quality of 
the experimentalist public sphere concept. Secondly, I looked at how the model 
applies in practice by analysing the European Employment Strategy (EES). Thirdly, I 
went deeper into the normative framework by comparing the experimentalist 
institutional design for the public sphere to Habermas’ government by law model. 
Below, I will try sum up the findings by looking at what experimentalism has to offer 
in both analytical and normative terms. In other words, what is the particular 
contribution of democratic experimentalism to the understanding the European public 
sphere, and secondly, how can one assess its normative added value? My goal is to 
show that while democratic experimentalism may have significant shortcomings with 
regard to democratic safeguards, it nevertheless directs attention to the peculiar 
dynamics of the EU. 
6.1 Analytical assessment 
In chapter four, I analysed the European Employment Strategy (EES) – the prototype 
of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – using a set of indicators derived from 
democratic experimentalism. My conclusions are probably rather dismal seen from 
the perspective of democratic experimentalism because few of its indicators gave a 
thorough rendering of the EES. However, the analysis did point towards some 
promising, although embryonic, tendencies concerning institutional architecture, 
encouragement of broad participation and frame of reference.  
First of all, chapter four showed that although the Employment Strategy cannot boast 
an infrastructure that would comply with the normative requirements of democratic 
experimentalism, the logic of the EES process embraces the idea of central 
preparation of arenas for exchanging information, as well as subsidiary decision-
making. This is probably more visible at the European than the national level, and it 
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is of course a grave problem that the European citizens do not seem interested. 
However the design creates a window of opportunity for both a broader array of 
participants as well as for the observing public. Although transparency is still a 
problem, the performances of the member states are exposed. The fact that European 
citizens are able to observe the same political processes is a necessary, albeit not 
sufficient, prerequisite for the development of a public sphere. To be democratic, 
citizens must also be able to participate in and control the decision-making process.  
This does not mean that a low degree of inclusion is the biggest problem for the EES. 
Rather, broad consultation is another necessary but not sufficient democratic 
condition. The actual problem is dual; one side is the lack of public influence on the 
processes that decide on the broad framework goals, another is that at the national 
levels the EES infrastructure deviates from the European pattern. Because the 
political processes in the European Council are closed, a European audience is 
effectively blocked out. Moreover, post-justifications become more vulnerable to the 
blame-game when participants do not have to disclose their own actions.  However, I 
would like to focus on the latter point, namely that subsidiarity becomes an excuse 
for governmental dominance. The EES process rarely coincides with the national 
processes. Thus, it may not seem that there is a great need to pay attention to what is 
happening at the European level, because the important decisions are made in each 
national parliaments. This inference largely depends on the effect that is awarded the 
EES, and as I have pointed out earlier, the concrete effects seem to be dependent on 
the direction of each national policy programme. However, this does not mean that 
the Employment Strategy does not represent a difference. If governments refer to the 
EES process as a restraint on political choice, then it is important for citizens and 
civil society to be preoccupied with the EES as well as national processes. 
Consequently, the fact that the former runs parallel with the latter may overburden 
actors with less resources than the state authorities.  
At the same time, the exploration of the EES showed that broader participation is 
encouraged both by the Commission, through the guidelines, and through financial 
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mechanisms like the European Social Fund. To a certain extent, this encouragement 
has shown some results. Transnational networks have developed, local partnerships 
have been established, civil society has used the EES to demand greater involvement 
and local actors have expressed the need for stronger structures (COM 2001 629 
final). However, the process has not activated the national parliaments, the broader 
public or the media, who are unfamiliar with the process. Thus, one structural 
prerequisite for the public sphere might be in place, but the majority of the actors 
who are actually affected by the Employment Strategy do not pay attention. By 
contrast, the infamous Service Directive stimulated a huge debate, and even European 
level demonstrations. 
Given that one main effect of the EES is the development of a normative framework, 
one could also say that there is a principled debate taking place at the European level, 
not entirely out of reach, but certainly outside the scope of attention of the European 
citizenry. This means that the EES has contributed to the development of a European 
public sphere in the sense that it has built up nascent cognitive and material structures 
for debating employment issues, but at the same time, these structures do not connect 
to the larger public.  For the development of a public sphere this is a larger problem 
than the lack of inclusion in deciding on guidelines or preparing National Action 
Plans, because it means that the audience is not listening. Again, the point is that it 
does not suffice to create opportunity structures for observation and participation if 
there is no interest from the side of the people that are supposed to constitute the 
audience; whether it is the citizens, media or civil society.  
At the same time, despite the disparity between the democratic experimentalists’ ideal 
and how the EES actually functions, the above analysis of the EES calls attention to 
two important things. First that the normative framework constitutes something 
common, of general interest, and in effect an arena where it can be discussed, 
regardless of the lack of attention it actually receives. Secondly, the member states 
appear less active than the European level in encouraging public engagement. In my 
opinion, this shows that a well-functioning public sphere at the European level must 
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be manifested in the Europeanization of existing national publics, i.e. must be able to 
launch lively public debates at the national level. Conversely, if the EES process in 
the member states is reduced to technocracy, it is not a big surprise that the process at 
the European level is described as “transgovernmental” (Jacobsson 2001: 9). Thus, it 
would be interesting to find out whether, and to what extent, national governments 
use obligations to their European cooperative partners as arguments for policy 
decisions.  
In sum, despite the numerous structural constraints, as well as an alarming lack of 
public attention, I still think it is possible to conclude that the Employment Strategy 
has the potential to generate a public sphere. However, the question is whether its 
lack of achievement as of yet can be explained by failures of institutional design or 
other preconditions such as lack of collective identity. Of course, I will not attempt to 
answer this here, but the theoretical considerations below may at least shed light on a 
few related questions. 
6.2 Normative assessment 
One main question is whether the exploration in this thesis leads to the conclusion 
that democratic experimentalism stimulates a new conceptualisation of the European 
public sphere. To answer this, I will draw on the findings of all three analytical 
chapters. However, I will start by pointing out how democratic experimentalism, 
more or less explicit, tries to replace the weaknesses of Habermas’ model with an 
alternative that allegedly is more in tune with a modern condition of diversity and 
volatility and realises a fuller potential of democracy (Cohen and Sabel 1997). 
As I mentioned in the chapter two, experimentalists have criticised Habermas for 
restraining the public sphere by promoting justice at the expense of effectiveness 
(ibid.). Thus, they point to a problem that has also been criticised by others notably 
that by insisting on a strict separation between the functions of the state and the 
public sphere, it becomes difficult to see how the public consists of self-legislators, 
i.e. how they affect political decisions (Bohman 1996; Eriksen and Weigård 2003). 
Furthermore, Habermas’ core-periphery model relies on the existence of channels of 
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influence that link opinion-formation in the public sphere to will-formation in 
political institutions, such as the political parties, as well as on media as a central 
arena (1996a). In an EU context, there are few European-wide media (Eriksen 2004), 
and as I pointed to in the analysis of the Employment Strategy, the national media do 
not necessarily pay much attention to every type of activity at the EU-level. With 
regard to the parties, they do not play the same role in the EU as at the national level. 
For instance, some assert that European party activity is confined to the European 
Parliament and that there is only a very weak electoral connection between the MEPs 
and the voters (Kreppel 2002), while others go as far as to say that parties are no 
different from other types of actors in the European governance process (Ladrech 
1998). Furthermore, Gerstenberg claims that the autonomous legal system advanced 
by Habermas will quickly turn into legal domination because the European public 
sphere does not have the capacity to control and criticise the European Court of 
Justice, and as a result, this view “exempts citizens and social actors (…) from the 
task of taking into account and interpreting constitutional reasons” (Gerstenberg 
2002: 356).   
Consequently, one interesting supposition is that governance processes such as the 
EES, can play a more important role in the EU than in each of the member states due 
to the special case of the European Union. In other words, such processes could also 
be seen potential substitutes for, or at least constructive accompaniments to, the lack 
of European party politics. To establish this for certain would of course require a 
thorough comparison, but at the same time, it is an important consideration to make 
in discussions about the development of the public sphere. And democratic 
experimentalism may actually be of some help here. My point is that by downplaying 
the role of central institutions, democratic experimentalism avoids some of the 
problems that arise when a national structure is transferred to the European level. The 
question is whether democratic experimentalism also presents a convincing case for 
an alternative understanding of the European public sphere. The conclusions above 
demonstrate that although democratic experimentalism brings out some interesting 
features of the Employment Strategy, it also shows that the EES does not activate a 
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public sphere. Moreover, I believe that the exploration of the EES point to some of 
the more normative problems that experimentalists encounter by operating with an 
institutional design that depicts an organisationally dispersed public sphere.  
The assessment of the public sphere perspective of democratic experimentalism 
against a baseline definition indicated that the structure posited by experimentalists is 
perhaps too flexible to provide for stable processes. Put differently, this means that 
while the ideal model clearly denotes a triangular structure with emphasis on 
openness, it does not provide sufficient structures for inclusiveness and influence. 
Although citizens, or at least representative groups of citizens, are allowed to 
participate directly in local decision-making processes, what is lacking is a 
specification of when and how other actors, not belonging to the particular local unit, 
may participate. Decisions that have indirect consequences, i.e. consequences to 
persons besides those deciding on them, could be used to define public issues (Dewey 
1927). Of course whoever feels affected by a decision-making process cannot 
participate in it, but this begs the question of how citizens can affect issues that they 
perceive as common concerns. The role of representative institutions such as 
parliaments is curtailed in the experimentalist model, but a reasonable alternative is 
not presented.   
It would be a misconception to say that a person is a self-legislator if her ability to 
influence a decision-making process is restricted to what goes on within the local 
units that she belongs to. Precisely because public issues have indirect consequences, 
citizens will be affected by decisions made elsewhere. Democratic experimentalists’ 
offer of direct participation cannot compensate for the apparent overthrow of the 
citizens’ role as principal25. Admittedly, the new political architecture institutes a 
continuous comparison of performance and procedures across units as well as within 
– this is one of the conditions for democracy. However, the question is if principles 
should be put to practice on basis of a benchmarking procedure. Against the backdrop 
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that the development and safeguard of rights are part of a continuous process where 
rights are evaluated in the context of goals adjusted to means, minorities may have a 
harder time voicing their concerns. The reason is that a comparison among local units 
will not necessarily include their apprehensions if it is not a benchmark or part of a 
local unit strategy. In a political system with a clearer division of labour and a 
separation of powers, minorities who feel neglected could for instance appeal to the 
national legislature. But since democratic experimentalism removes parliament’s 
power to instruct, except for deciding on very broad goals, it would not be of much 
help. Appealing to the court could be a similarly disillusioning exercise because the 
court does not rule on a set of given laws, but on its own assessment of constitutional 
and political reasons. One could also add to this that it may become harder to create 
powerful counterpublics or gain influence with opinions that have no direct 
connection to functionality when the parliaments are also consigned to assist local 
units. In short, what is at stake is the public sphere’s character as a critical institution.   
In my opinion, democratic experimentalism is not capable of correcting the 
fragmentation that is caused by allocating more power to autonomous local units, 
partly because by removing the separation between powers, the filtering of power is 
weakened, and partly because the redistribution of competence makes it more 
difficult to hold decision-makers accountable. Regarding the former, it seems to be 
the local units that are supposed to provide a form of filter through the benchmarking 
procedure, and in effect check themselves by being exposed to better performances. 
But the problem is that the main purpose of this process is to benchmark 
performance, and as I have just pointed out, it is uncertain whether principles should 
be decided on according to best practice. With regard to accountability, the question 
is who to hold responsible if one believes that a decision has violated an important 
right.  
                                                                                                                                           
25 In addition, there is the problem of affectedness, that is also challenges Habermas’ government by law model. If the 
principle of affectedness is taken to the extreme, then citizens in other countries would have the right to participate in 
decision-making bodies all over the world if they were, or perceived themselves to be affected by a given law.  
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If what experimentalists claim is true, that societies basically share the same goals or 
rest on some common ground, then it is probably more understandable that deciding 
on rights according to best practice would produce fair results, because they would be 
safeguarded by a form of historical collective identity, although not necessarily 
confined to territory. But at least in the case of the European Union, which could not 
be viewed as consolidated in this sense, such a common ground is not to be expected. 
Admittedly, the European Union represents a special context, but I believe that it also 
would be important to keep this in mind when applying the experimentalist ideal to 
the nation state. 
To sum up, the public sphere perspective of democratic experimentalism does not 
seem to present a very convincing case as a normative model for the European public 
sphere. However, the explorations in this thesis have called attention to aspects of the 
EU’s institutional design that are important for its development, both from an 
empirical and normative perspective. First of all, the normative analyses have shown 
that it is important to be aware of the problems inherent in theories that suggest 
governance processes as a democratic alternative, especially in the case of the EU 
where these processes tend to be applied in sensitive areas such as employment and 
social policy that historically have been exempted from European legislation because 
they have not met with political support (Jacobsson 2001). Thus, this thesis has 
suggested that the promise of inclusion and increased participation that is 
incorporated in democratic experimentalism must not be confused with the 
development of a comprehensive, not to mention accessible, public sphere that is able 
to criticise and influence decisions. Furthermore, as an analytical model, 
experimentalism draws attention to new structures that may provide for the 
development of a European public sphere if it is able to activate the European 
citizenry. Moreover, this becomes all the more interesting because the institutional 
prerequisites that are derived from a governmental model face huge challenges at the 
European level. While the latter presents dismal prospects, the former might represent 
an interesting proxy.  
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Secondly, the exploration of the Employment Strategy illustrated that the EU cannot 
take the entire responsibility for the lack of activation of a European public. It is at 
the national level that the infrastructure of the EES meets most resistance, and this 
may indicate that without an effort from national governments to generate a 
Europeanised public debate, or if coordination strategies like the EES continue to be 
dominated by governmental actors, a viable European public sphere will have a hard 
time developing. Thus, it would be interesting take a closer look at the reasons for the 
lack of inclusion of other actors, as well as the reasons for failure to coordinate the 
European and national employment policy processes.  
This means that a conceptualisation of the European public sphere and its 
institutional conditions must also include an understanding of its institutional design 
at the national level, i.e. of the subpublics. Transnational networks are important, and 
some have indeed been constituted in response to the European Union and at the 
European level26. Nevertheless, I believe that it is likewise important to focus on the 
national levels and national actors. At this moment, the Employment Strategy has 
produced a cognitive framework that also affects other policy areas. This framework 
generated by the EES shapes employment policies all over Europe, but as long as 
governments and technocracy continue to dominate, the real impact of the EES will 
remain vague, regardless of its actual effect. As a consequence, it becomes less clear 
why anyone should respond to the EU as a decision-making centre because it is not 
obvious what effect it actually has. And judging by the member states’ reluctance to 
respond to the Commission’s encouragement of broader participation, this situation 
seems to suit the governments just fine. Accordingly, the problem of inclusiveness 
and influence must be addressed at both the European, but also at each national level. 
In other words, because of the multi-level structure of the European Union, in order 
to create a European public sphere, national public spheres must be Europeanised in 
                                              
26 See for instance www.anothereuropeispossible, for one of the initiatives that has developed in response to the European 
constitutional process.  
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the sense that non-governmental actors are allowed, and invited, to participate in 
European processes at the national level.      
Democratic experimentalism shows that the European Employment Strategy could 
contribute to the creation of a common communicative space in the EU. The 
structures are there and a collective frame of reference is developing. However, a 
broader range of actors and the entire European citizenry must also take part in the 
process of defining the principles for the direction a European employment policy, if 
not directly at the European level, than at least within their own home countries. A 
European public sphere cannot consist of 25 national publics that do not overlap; 
however, it is important to remember that it probably cannot exist without them 
either, and that this has to be taken into account when trying to understand how a 
European public sphere develops.     
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